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
M. TULLII CICERONIS
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LAELIUS OR A DISCOUR
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LÆLIUS;

OR A

DIALOGUE ON FRIENDSHIP.

BY

M. TULLIUS CICERO.

WITH TRANSLATION AND NOTES,

BY

THE EDITORS OF THE ANALYTICAL SERIES OF GREEK AND LATIN CLASSICS.

London:
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M. TULLII CICERONIS

SIVE

LÆLIUS,

DE AMICITIA DIALOGUS.

AD T. POMPONIUM ATTICUM.

I.—Q. Mucius augur multa narrare de C. Lælio socero suo memoriter et jucunde solebat nec dubitare illum in omni sermone appellare sapientem. Ego autem a patre ita eram deductus ad Scævolam, sumpta virili toga, ut, quoad possem et liceret, a senis latere nunquam discederem. Itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commode dicta memoriæ mandabam, fierique studebam ejus prudentia doctior. Quo mortuo, me ad pontificem Scævolam contuli, quem unum nostræ civitatis et ingenio et justitia præstantissimum audeo dicere. Sed de hoc alias: nunc redeo ad augurem. Quum sæpe multa, tum memini, domi in hemicyclio sedentem, ut solebat, quum et ego essem una et pauci admodum familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere, qui tum fere omnibus erat in

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MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO'S

LÆLIUS,

OR

A DIALOGUE ON FRIENDSHIP.

TO TITUS POMPONIUS ATTICUS.

I.—Quintus Mucius, the Augur, was accustomed to relate many things about Caius Lælius, his father-in-law, with good memory, and in an agreeable way, and not to hesitate to call him, in all his discourse, a Wise *Man*. Moreover, I had been introduced to Scævola in such a way by my father when I had assumed the manly gown, that, as far as I was able and it was permitted *me*, I never departed from the old man's side. Consequently, many things thoughtfully discussed by him, many things also tersely and pointedly said, I committed to memory, and took pains to become more learned by his wisdom. And when he was dead, I betook myself to Scævola, the Pontiff, whom I venture to call the one of our state most distinguished for ability and justice. But about him at another time: I return now to the Augur. While often *he discussed* many *other* things, I especially remember that at home, sitting in *his* arm-chair, as he was wont, when both I was there and a very few intimate friends, he fell upon that topic which was about that time in everybody's

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ore. Meministi enim profecto, Attice, et eo magis quod P. Sulpicio utebare multum; quum is tribunus plebis capitali odio a Q. Pompeio, qui tum erat consul, dissideret, quocum conjunctissime et amantissime vixerat, quanta esset hominum vel admiratio vel querela. Itaque tum Scævola, quum in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, exposuit nobis sermonem Lælii de amicitia, habitum ab illo secum et cum altero genero C. Fannio, M. F., paucis diebus post mortem Africani. Ejus disputationis sententias memoriæ mandavi; quas hoc libro exposui arbitratu meo: quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne *inquam* et *inquit* sæpius interponeretur, atque ut tamquam a præsentibus coram haberi sermo videretur. Quum enim sæpe mecum ageres, ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi res quum omnium cognitione, tum nostra familiaritate visa est. Itaque feci non invitus, ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. Sed, ut in Catone Majore, qui est scriptus ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur aptior persona, quæ de illa ætate loqueretur, quam ejus, qui et diutissime senex fuisset, et in ipsa senectute præter ceteros floruisset: sic, quum accepissemus a patribus, maxime memorabilem C. Lælii et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Lælii persona visa est, quæ de amicitia ea ipsa dissereret, quæ disputata ab eo meminisset Scævola. Genus autem hoc sermonum, positum

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mouth. For surely you remember, Atticus,—and the more so because you were very intimate with Publius Sulpicius, when he, *being* tribune of the people was estranged by a mortal enmity from Quintus Pompeius, who was at that time consul, with whom he had lived most intimately and affectionately,—how great was the surprise or regret of *all* men. Consequently, at that time, Scævola, when he had fallen upon that very subject, set forth to us Lælius's discourse on "Friendship," delivered by him (*i.e.* Lælius) in company with himself and with *his* other son-in-law, Caius Fannius, son of Marcus, a few days after the death of Africanus. Of that discourse I committed the sentiments to memory, and these in this book I have set forth, according to my own judgment; for I have, as it were, introduced *the men* themselves conversing, that *the words* "say I" and "says he," might not be too frequently brought in, and that the discourse might seem to be held, as it were, by *persons* present face to face. For since you often pleaded with me that I should write something about Friendship, the subject appeared to me worthy both of the consideration of all, and of our acquaintance. And therefore I have so acted as, not unwillingly, to benefit many at your request. But, as in Cato Major, which was written to you about Old Age, I introduced Cato *as* an aged man discussing *it*, because no character appeared *to me* more suitable to speak about that *old* age, than his, who had both been an old man a very long time, and in old age itself had been distinguished above others; so, since we had learned from *our* ancestors that the friendship of C. Lælius and P. Scipio was especially memorable, the character of Lælius seemed to me suitable to utter those very things concerning Friendship, which Scævola remembered *to have been* discussed by him. Moreover, this kind of discourse, based

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in hominum veterum auctoritate et eorum illustrium, plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis. Itaque ipse mea legens sic afficior interdum, ut Catonem, non me loqui existimem. Sed, ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus de amicitia scripsi. Tum est Cato locutus, quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior: nunc Lælius, et sapiens, (sic enim est habitus,) et amicitiæ gloria excellens, de amicitia loquitur. Tu velim animum a me parumper avertas, Lælium loqui ipsum putes. C. Fannius et Q. Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani: ab his sermo oritur; respondet Lælius, cujus tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens tu te ipse cognosces.

II.—Fannius. Sunt ista, Læli! Nec enim melior vir fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior. Sed existimare debes omnium oculos nunc in te esse conjectos; unum te sapientem et appellant et existimant. Tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni: scimus L. Attilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse *Sapientem;* sed uterque alio quodam modo: Attilius, quia prudens esse in jure civili putabatur; Cato, quia multarum rerum usum habebat: (multa ejus et in senatu et in foro vel provisa prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur:) propterea quasi cognomen jam habebat in senectute sapientis. Te autem alio quodam modo, non solum natura et moribus,

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on the authority of ancient men, and those of distinction, seems, I know not by what means, to have more weight. Consequently, I myself, reading my own *writings*, am sometimes so interested that I think Cato, and not myself, is speaking. But as then *I wrote* as an aged man to an aged man about Old Age, so in this book I have written as a very great friend to a friend about Friendship. Then, Cato spoke, than whom there was scarcely any one in those times more aged, no one more experienced. Now, Lælius, both a wise *man* (for so he has been considered), and distinguished for the celebrity of *his* friendship, speaks about Friendship. I could wish *that* you would turn away *your* attention from me for a time *and* suppose Lælius himself to be speaking. Caius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to *their* father-in-law after the death of Africanus: with them the conversation commences. Lælius replies, and his whole discourse is about Friendship, which, while reading, you will recognise yourself.

II.—Fannius. *Your statements* are *true*, Lælius, for has any better man existed than Africanus, nor neither *one* more illustrious. But you must consider that the eyes of all are now directed towards you; you alone they both style and esteem a Wise *Man*. This *title* was bestowed just lately on Marcus Cato. We know that Lucius Attilius, in the time of our ancestors, was styled a Wise *Man*, but each in a somewhat different way: Attilius, because he was reputed to be skilled in civil law; Cato, because he had experience in many things. Many things used to be related of him, both in the senate and the forum, either wisely foreseen, or diligently pleaded, or cleverly answered: on that account he had already in *his* old age as it were the surname of "the Wise." You, however, *we know* to be wise in some other manner, not only by nature and character,

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verum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem; ne
sicut vulgus, sed ut eruditi solent appellare *sapientem*
qualem in Græcia neminem. Nam qui *septem* appel
lantur, eos, qui ista subtilius quærunt, in numero
sapientium non habent. Athenis unum accepimus, e
eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum
judicatum. Hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant, u
omnia tua in te posita ducas, humanosque casus virtute
inferiores putes. Itaque ex me quærunt, credo item
ex hoc [Scævola] quonam pacto mortem Africani
feras: eoque magis, quod his proximis Nonis, quum in
hortos D. Bruti auguris commentandi causa, ut assolet,
venissemus, tu non adfuisti, qui diligentissime semper
illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.

Scævola. Quærunt quidem, C. Læli, multi, ut est a
Fannio dictum: sed ego id respondeo, quod animad-
verti, te dolorem, quem acceperis quum summi viri
tum amicissimi morte, ferre moderate; nec potuisse
non commoveri, nec fuisse id humanitatis tuæ: quod
autem his Nonis in collegio nostro non adfuisses, vale-
tudinem causam, non mæstitiam fuisse.

Lælius. Recte tu quidem, Scævola, et vere: nec enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi, quum valerem, abduci incommodo meo debui, nec ullo casu arbitror hoc constanti homini posse contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat officii. Tu autem, Fanni, qui, mihi tantum tribui dicis, quantum ego nec agnosco nec postulo,

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but also by your zeal and learning, and not as the vulgar, but as the educated are accustomed to call "wise," in a sense in which *they call* no one in Greece. For those who investigate those *matters* very deeply do not include in the number of "Wise Men," those who are called "The Seven." We have heard of one at Athens, and that he indeed was adjudged the wisest *of men* even by the oracle of Apollo. They think that this wisdom is in you, since you hold that all your *happiness* rests in yourself, and think human accidents of less consideration than virtue. And therefore they inquire of me, I believe also of this Scævola *here*, in what manner you bear the death of Africanus, and the more so, because on these last Nones when we had come, as is customary, into the gardens of D. Brutus the Augur, for the purpose of practice, you were not present, who had been accustomed most diligently always to observe that day and that duty.

SCÆVOLA. Many, indeed, enquire, Caius Lælius, as has been said by Fannius; but I reply that which I have observed, viz. that the affliction which you have received by the death of both a very great man and a very great friend, you bear with moderation, and that you could not but be disturbed, nor was that *characteristic* of your tenderness; that, however, you were not present in our college at these Nones, ill health was the cause, not sorrow.

LÆLIUS. You speak indeed correctly and truly, Scævola, for neither from that duty, which I have always performed, when I was well, ought I to have been withdrawn by my *own* discomfort, nor do I think that by any chance this can happen to a man of firm purpose, that any omission of *his* duty should occur. But you, Fannius, who say that so much is attributed to me, which I neither acknowledge nor desire,

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facis amice: sed, ut mihi videris, non recte judicas d Catone. Aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis cred aut, si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. Quomodo, ut al omittam, mortem filii tulit! Memineram Paullur videram Gallum: sed hi in pueris; Cato in perfecto spectato viro. Quamobrem cave Catoni anteponas n istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientis simum judicavit: hujus enim facta, illius dicta lau dantur. De me autem, ut jam cum utroque loqua sic habetote.

III.—Ego, si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem quam id recte faciam, viderint sapientes; sed cert mentiar. Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, u arbitror, nemo umquam erit; ut confirmare possum nemo certe fuit. Sed non egeo medicina; me ips consolor, et maxime illo solatio, quod eo errore care quo amicorum decessu plerique angi solent. Nih enim mali accidisse Scipioni puto. Mihi accidit, s quid accidit: suis autem incommodis graviter angi non amicum, sed seipsum amantis est. Cum illo ver quis neget actum esse præclare? Nisi enim, quod ill minime putabat, immortalitatem optare vellet, quic non est adeptus, quod homini fas esset optare? qu summam spem civium, quam de eo jam puero habue rant, continuo adolescens incredibili virtute superavit qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus est consu bis; primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore

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are acting in a friendly manner, but, as you appear to me, you do not judge rightly about Cato. For either no one, which indeed I rather believe, or if any one, he was a wise man. How, to omit other matters, he bore his son's death! I remember Paullus, I had seen Gallus; but these *bore bereavement* in the case of boys; Cato in the case of a mature and noted man. Wherefore, take care to prefer to Cato not even that man himself, whom Apollo, as you say, adjudged the wisest; for of the former the deeds, of the latter the words are commended. Of myself, however, that I may now speak with each *of you*, form your opinion thus.

III.—I, if I were to deny that I am affected with regret for Scipio, how justly I should do it, let the wise judge, but assuredly I should lie. For I am affected, being bereft of such a friend as, as I think, no one ever will be *to me*, as I can affirm, no one assuredly has been. But I do not want medicine: I console myself, and especially with that consolation, because I am free from the delusion by which most men, at the decease of their friends, are wont to be distressed. For I think that no evil has happened to Scipio. It has happened to me, if any has happened. But to be greatly troubled at his own losses is *characteristic of* one who loves, not *his* friend, but himself. With him, however, who can deny that *life* was spent nobly? For unless, which he by no means thought, he chose to wish for immortality, what did he not obtain which it is lawful for a *man* to desire? who, while still a youth, surpassed, by *his* incredible merit, the highest expectation of *his* fellow citizens, which they had regarding him already when a boy; who never became a candidate for the consulship, *yet* was made consul twice; on the first occasion before *the usual* time, on the second,

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reipublicæ pæne sero; qui duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo præsentia, verum etiam futura bella delevit. Quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, justitia in omnes? Nota sunt vobis. Quam autem civitati carus fuerit, mærore funeris indicatum est. Quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio juvare potuisset? Senectus enim quamvis non sit gravis, ut memini Catonem anno ante, quam mortuus est, mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen aufert eam viriditatem, in qua etiamnum erat Scipio. Quamobrem vita quidem talis fuit vel fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere. Moriendi autem sensum celeritas abstulit; quo de genere mortis difficile dictu est; quid homines suspicentur, videtis. Hoc tamen vere licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex multis diebus, quos in vita celeberrimos lætissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, quum senatu dimisso domum reductus ad vesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e vita; ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius, quam ad inferos pervenisse.

IV.—Neque enim assentior iis, qui hæc nuper disserere cœperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire atque omnia morte deleri. Plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum majorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa jura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, vel eorum, qui

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; his proper age so far as he was concerned, almost too te for the State; who, having overthrown two cities ost hostile to this government, put an end to not only :esent, but also future wars. What can I say of *his* ost affable manners, of *his* dutiful affection towards *s* mother, of *his* generosity to *his* sisters, of his good- ess to his own, of his justice to all? They are known you. Moreover, how dear he was to the state was own by the grief at *his* funeral. How then could the ldition of a few years have benefited him? For old ge, although it be not painful, as I remember Cato e year before he died said in conversing with me and cipio, nevertheless it takes away that vigour in which cipio lived even then. Wherefore *his* life indeed was ich, whether in fortune or reputation, that nothing ould be added to it. Moreover, the suddenness *of his eath* took away the sense of dying; of which kind of eath it is difficult to speak; what men suspect you see. his nevertheless *we* certainly may say:—to P. Scipio, it of the many days which, most honoured and most yful, he saw in his lifetime, that day was the most lorious, when, after the senate was dismissed, he was scorted home at evening by the conscript Fathers, the oman people, the Allies and the Latini, the day before e died; so that, from so lofty a position of dignity, he eems rather to have gone to the gods above than to iose below.

IV.—For neither do I agree with those who have late begun to discuss these *matters*, that the souls erish at the same time with the bodies, and all *things* e destroyed by death. The authority of the ancients is more weight with me, or of *our* ancestors, who warded to the dead such religious observances assuredly they would not have done if they iought nothing affected them, or of those, who

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in hac terra fuerunt, magnamque Græciam, quæ nu quidem deleta est, tunc florebat, institutis et præcept suis erudierunt: vel ejus, qui Apollinis oracula sapie tissimus est judicatus, qui non tum hoc, tum illud, in plerisque, sed idem semper, *Animos hominum es divinos, iisque, quum e corpore excessissent, reditum cœlum patere optimoque et justissimo cuique exped tissimum.* Quod item Scipioni videbatur, qui quide quasi præsagiret, perpaucis ante mortem diebus, quu et Philus et Manilius adessent, et alii plures tuq etiam, Scævola, mecum venisses, triduum disseruit d republica: cujus disputationis fuit extremum fere d immortalitate animorum: quæ se in quiete per visu ex Africano audisse dicebat. Id si ita est, ut opti cujusque animus in morte facillime evolet tamquam custodia vinculisque corporis; cui censemus cursu ad deos faciliorem fuisse, quam Scipioni? Quocir mærere hoc ejus eventu vereor ne invidi magis qua amici sit. Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus s animorum et corporum, nec ullus sensus maneat, nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali. Sensu eni amisso, fit idem, quasi natus non esset omnino; que tamen esse natum et nos gaudemus, et hæc civita dum erit, lætabitur. Quamobrem cum illo quider ut supra dixi, actum optime est, mecum incommodiu quem fuerat æquius, ut introieram, sic prius exi

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ıave lived in this country, and instructed Magna Græcia, which now indeed is destroyed, *but* at that time was lourishing, by their principles and maxims, or of him vho was adjudged by the oracle of Apollo the wisest *of nen*, who *taught*, not at one time this, at another that, as *ie did* in most *things*, but always the same; viz. that the ;ouls of men are divine, and that to them, when they ıave departed from the body, a return into heaven lies ›pen and most speedy to all the most upright and most ust. And this also appeared to Scipio *to be the case*, who indeed, as if he had a presentiment, a few days ›efore his death, when both Philus and Manilius were ›resent, and several others, and thou also, Scævola, ıad come with me, discoursed for three days about the State; and of this discourse the end was chiefly about ;he immortality of souls; things which he used to ıay he had learnt from Africanus, in a vision during ıleep. If this is so, that the souls of all the best men ly away in death most easily as it were from the im- ›risonment and bonds of the body; to whom do we udge that there has been an easier passage to the gods ;han to Scipio? Wherefore, I fear that to mourn, on ıccount of this his departure, would be rather a mark ›f one who envied *him* than of a friend. But if, on he contrary, those *statements* are more true, that there s the same destruction of souls and bodies, and that ıot any consciousness remains, as there is nothing good n death, so assuredly *there is* nothing evil. For when ›onsciousness is lost, the same thing happens as if *ne* had not been born at all, still, that he was born, ›oth we rejoice, and this State, so long as it shall ast, will rejoice. Wherefore, with him indeed, as I ıave said before, life has ended most nobly, with me, nore disadvantageously; and it had been more fit that , as I had entered *life first*, so I should first depart out

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de vita. Sed tamen recordatione nostræ amicitiæ sic fruor, ut beate vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vixerim, quocum mihi conjuncta cura de republica et de privata fuit, quocum et domus et militia communis et id in quo est omnis vis amicitiæ, voluntatem, studiorum, sententiarum summa consensio. Itaque non tam ista me sapientiæ, quam modo Fannius commemoravit, famà delectat, falso præsertim, quam quod amicitiæ nostræ memoriam spero sempiternam fore: idque mihi eo magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus sæculis vix tria aut quatuor nominantur paria amicorum: quo in genere sperare videor, Scipionis et Lælii amicitiam notam posteritati fore.

FANN. Istud quidem, Læli, ita necesse est. Sed, quoniam amicitiæ mentionem fecisti et sumus otiosi, pergratum mihi feceris, (spero item Scævolæ) si, quemadmodum soles de ceteris rebus, quum ex te quæruntur, sic de amicitia disputaris, quid sentias, qualem existimes, quæ præcepta des.

SCÆV. Mihi vero pergratum erit: atque, id ipsum quum tecum agere conarer, Fannius antevertit: quamobrem utrique nostrûm gratum admodum feceris.

V.—LÆL. Ego vero non gravarer, si mihi ipse confiderem: nam et præclara res est, et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi. Sed quis ego sum? aut quæ in me est facultas? Doctorum est ista consuetudo eaque Græcorum, ut iis ponatur, de quo disputent quamvis subito

of life. But nevertheless, I so enjoy the remembrance of our Friendship, that I seemed to have lived happily, because I have lived with Scipio, with whom was shared by me care *both* for public and private affairs; with whom both home and military service *were* shared, and *there was* that in which all the power of Friendship consists, the highest agreement of wishes, pursuits and sentiments. Consequently, that reputation for wisdom which Fannius has just now mentioned does not so much delight me, especially as *it is* undeserved, as that I hope the memory of our Friendship will be imperishable. And this is the more agreeable to me, because, out of all the ages, scarcely three or four pairs of friends are mentioned, in which class I seem to hope the friendship of Scipio and Lælius will be known to posterity.

FANNIUS. That indeed, Lælius, must be so. But, since you have made mention of Friendship, and we are at leisure, you will do me a great favour (I hope Scævola too) if, as you are accustomed with respect to other matters, when they are asked of you, so you will discourse concerning Friendship, what you think, of what kind you conceive *it to be*, what rules *with regard to it* you give.

SCÆVOLA. It will indeed be very agreeable to me, and that very request, when I was essaying to plead with you, Fannius anticipated; therefore you will do *what is* very agreeable to each of us.

V.—LÆLIUS. I should not indeed feel unwilling if I had confidence in myself; for both the subject is very glorious, and we are, as Fannius has said, at leisure. But who am I? or what ability is there in me? It is a custom of the learned, and that *too* of the Greeks, that *a subject* be assigned them, concerning which they may dispute, however unpremeditatedly.

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Magnum opus est egetque exercitatione non parv
Quamobrem, quæ disputari de amicitia possunt, a
eis, censeo, petatis, qui ista profitentur: ego vo
horta ritantum possum, ut amicitiam omnibus rebu
humanis anteponatis: nihil est enim tam natur
aptum tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversa
Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam ess
non posse: neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi, qui hæ
subtilius disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad communem
utilitatem parum: negant enim quemquam virum
bonum esse, nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane: sed ea
sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nem
est consecutus. Nos autem ea, quæ sunt in usu vitaq
communi, non ea, quæ finguntur aut optantur, specta
debemus. Numquam ego dicam, C. Fabricium, M
Curium, Ti. Coruncanium, quos sapientes nostri majore
judicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes. Qua
sibi habeant sapientiæ nomen et invidiosum et o
scurum; concedant, ut hi boni viri fuerint. Ne
quidem facient: negabunt id, nisi sapienti, posse co
cedi. Agamus igitur *pingui Minerva*, ut aiunt. Qui i
se gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides, integrita
æquitas, liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas, v
libido, vel audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut
fuerunt, modo quos nominavi; hos viros bonos, ut habi
sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantu
quantum homines possunt, naturam—optimam be
vivendi ducem. Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, i
natos esse nos, ut inter omnes esset societas quædam

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It is a great task and requires no little practice. Wherefore, what can be discussed about Friendship, I think you should enquire from those who profess those *subjects*. I can only exhort you to prefer Friendship to all *other* human things, for there is nothing so congenial to nature, so adapted to either prosperity or adversity. But in the first place I think this,—that, except between the good, Friendship cannot exist, though I do not take this very strictly, as those *do*, who discuss these things too minutely, perhaps correctly, but not much to the common advantage; for they say that no one is a good man except the wise. Be it so, by all means; but they understand that wisdom which hitherto no mortal has attained. But those things which are in practice and in every-day life, not those which are *merely* imagined or desired, we ought to look at. Never will I say that C. Fabricius, M'. Curius, Ti. Coruncanius, whom our ancestors adjudged wise, were wise according to the rule of those *Stoics*. Wherefore, let them keep for themselves a definition of Wisdom both invidious and unintelligible; let them allow that these were good men. They will do not even that: they will deny that this *title* can be granted except to a wise man. Let us act, therefore, with plain common sense, as the saying is. Now *those* who so conduct themselves, so live that their sincerity, honesty, justice *and* liberality is proved, and *that* there is not in them any avarice, or lust, or presumption, and *that* they are of great consistency *of character*, as those were whom I have just mentioned; let us think that those, as they were considered, so ought to be called good men, because they follow, as much as men can, Nature, the best guide for living well. For thus I seem to myself to see clearly that we were so born, that between all there was a certain fellowship;

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major autem, ut quisque proxime accederet. Itaque cives potiores, quam peregrini; propinqui, quam alieni: cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit; sed ea non satis habet firmitatis. Namque hoc præstat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest: sublata enim benevolentia amicitiæ nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet. Quanta autem vis amicitiæ sit, ex hoc intelligi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et adducta in angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos jungeretur.

VI.—Est autem amicitia nihil aliud, nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate summa consensio: qua quidem haud scio an, excepta sapientia, quidquam melius homini sit a diis immortalibus datum. Divitias alii præponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates. Beluarum hoc quidem extremum est: illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris, quam in fortunæ temeritate. Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, præclare illi quidem; sed hæc ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignet et continet; nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest. Jam virtutem ex consuetudine vitæ sermonisque nostri interpretemur, nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur, virosque bonos eos, qui habentur, numeremus, Paullos, Catones, Gallos, Scipiones, Philos. His communis vita contenta est: eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.

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but the greater as each approached nearest *to another.* Consequently, fellow-citizens *are* preferable to foreigners, relations to strangers; for with these Nature herself has created Friendship, but it has not sufficient stability. For Friendship surpasses Relationship in this, that from Relationship kind feeling can be removed; from Friendship it cannot: for when good feeling has been taken away, the name of Friendship is taken away, *but that* of Relationship remains. How great, however, the power of Friendship is, can most fully be understood from this, that *starting* from the boundless fellowship of the human race, which Nature herself has cemented, it is a thing so contracted and reduced to a narrow *range*, that all affection is a union between two or between a few.

VI.—Now Friendship is nothing else than perfect agreement on all divine and human things, together with kindness and affection; and, wisdom indeed being excepted, probably not any better *gift* than this has been given by the immortal gods to man. Some prefer riches, some good health, some power, some honours; many even *prefer bodily* pleasures. This last, indeed, is *characteristic* of beasts, but those former *ones are* perishable and uncertain, dependent not so much upon our plans as on the fickleness of fortune. Those, however, who place the greatest good in virtue, *teach* admirably indeed; but this very virtue both produces and upholds Friendship: nor can Friendship by any means exist without virtue. Now let us explain virtue from the ordinary custom of life and of our speech, and not, as certain philosophers do, measure it out with pomposity of language, and let us reckon as good men those who are considered *such*—the Paulli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios and the Philos. Ordinary life is contented with these. But let us omit those who are nowhere at all found.

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Tales igitur inter viros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. Principio, qui potest esse *vita vitalis*, ut ait Ennius, quæ non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescat? Quid dulcius, quam habere, quicum omnia audeas sic loqui, ut tecum? Quis esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes, qui illis æque, ac tu ipse, gauderet? Adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam, quam tu, ferret. Denique ceteræ res, quæ expetuntur, opportunæ sunt singulæ rebus fere singulis: divitiæ, ut utare; opes, ut colare; honores, ut laudere; voluptates, ut gaudeas; valetudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis. Amicitia res plurimas continet: quoquo te verteris, præsto est: nullo loco excluditur: numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta est. Itaque non acqua, non igni ut aiunt, pluribus locis utimur, quam amicitia. Neque ego nunc de vulgari aut de mediocri, quæ tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit. Nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia, et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.

VII.—Quumque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum præstat omnibus, quod bonam spem prælucet in posterum, nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. Verum enim amicum qui intuetur tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui

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Among such men, therefore, Friendship has so great advantages as I can scarcely speak of. In the first place, how can there be "a life worth living," as Ennius says, which does not repose in the reciprocal goodwill of a friend? What can be pleasanter than to have *one* with whom you can venture to converse about all *things* as *you would* with yourself? What very great advantage would there be in prosperity, unless you had *a friend* who should rejoice in it as well as yourself? It would indeed be hard to endure adversity without one who would bear it with more grief than yourself. Lastly, other things which are desired are adapted, almost each to *its own* special purposes; riches, that you may spend *them;* power, that you may be respected; honours, that you may be praised; pleasures, that you may rejoice; health, that you may be free from pain and perform the duties of the body. Friendship embraces many things! whereever thou turnest thyself she is at hand; from no place is she excluded; never is she out of season, never troublesome. And consequently, as the proverb runs, we do not make use of fire and water on more occasions than Friendship. And I am not now speaking of the common or ordinary *kind of Friendship*, which however, itself is both pleasant and profitable, but of true and perfect Friendship, such as was theirs a few of whom are mentioned. For Friendship makes both prosperity brighter and adversity lighter, by sharing and communicating *them.*

VII.—And while Friendship comprises very many and very great advantages, it certainly also stands before all *other things* in this, that it shows forth a good hope for the future, and does not suffer the spirits either to be crushed or sink. For he who looks upon a true friend, beholds, as it were, a reflection of himself.

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Quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant—et imbecilli valent, et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt: tantus eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum. Ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. Quod si exemeris ex natura rerum benevolentiæ conjunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit; ne agri quidem cultus permanebit. Id si minus intelligitur, quanta vis amicitiæ concordiæque sit, ex dissensionibus atque discordiis percipi potest. Quæ enim domus tam stabilis, quæ tam firma civitas est, quæ non odiis atque dissidiis funditus possit everti? Ex quo, quantum boni sit in amicitia, judicari potest. Agrigentinum quidem doctum quemdam virum carminibus Græcis vaticinatum ferunt, quæ in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent, quæque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intelligunt et re probant. Itaque, si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est, qui id non maximis efferat laudibus? Qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitis et amici mei, M. Pacuvii, nova fabula! quum, ignorante rege, uter esset Orestes, Pylades Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur; Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret. Stantes plaudebant in re ficta: quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse? Facile indicabat ipsa natura vim suam, quum homines,

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Wherefore, both the absent are present, and the needy have abundance, and the feeble are strong, and, which is harder to be said, the dead live; so great honour, remembrance, regret of friends follows them. From which *consideration* the death of those seems blessed, the life of these praiseworthy. But if you take away from the universe the bond of good feeling, neither any house nor city will be able to stand, and not even will the cultivation of the land continue. If this is not sufficiently understood, viz.:—how great the power of Friendship and harmony is, it can be understood from disagreements and quarrels. For what house is so firmly established, what state so strong, that it cannot be destroyed completely by animosities and disagreements? From which *consideration*, how much good there is in Friendship can be judged. They say indeed that a certain learned Agrigentine man proclaimed in Greek verses, that the things which existed together in Nature and in the whole universe, and which were moved *apart*, friendship drew (them) together, *and* discord separated *them*. And this indeed all mortals both understand and approve in fact, and consequently, if at any time, any duty of a friend has been manifested in either encountering dangers or in sharing *them*, who is there who does not exalt it with the highest commendation? What acclamations *there were* in the whole theatre lately, in the new play of my host and friend M. Pacuvius! When, the King not knowing which *of the two* was Orestes, Pylades said that he was Orestes, that he might be put to death instead of him, but Orestes kept on saying that he was Orestes, as *really* was *the case*. *The spectators*, standing up, applauded in an imaginary event; what do we think they would have done in a real *one?* Nature herself easily showed her own power, when men

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quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero judicarent. Hactenus mihi videor, de amicitia quid sentirem, potuisse dicere. Si qua præterea sunt, (credo autem esse multa:) ab iis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant, quæritote.

Fann. Nos autem a te potius: quamquam etiam ab istis sæpe quæsivi et audivi non invitus equidem; sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuæ.

Scæv. Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis, quum est de republica disputatum, adfuisses. Qualis tum patronus justitiæ fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!

Fann. Facile id quidem fuit, justitiam justissimo viro defendere.

Scæv. Quid amicitiam? Nonne facile ei, qui ob eam summa fide constantia justitiaque servatam maximam gloriam ceperit?

VIII.—Læl. Vim hoc quidem est afferre! Quid enim refert, qua me rogatione cogatis? Cogitis certe. Studiis enim generorum præsertim in re bona, quum difficile est, tum ne æquum quidem obsistere.—Sæpissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, num propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut in dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio, vicissimque redderet; an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiæ, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa?

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judged that to be rightly done in *the case of* another, which they themselves could not do. Thus far I seem to myself to have been able to say what I thought about Friendship. If there are any matters besides (I believe, however, there are many), enquire of those, if you please, who discuss those *matters*.

FANNIUS. But we *would* rather *hear* from you, although I have also often enquired from them, and heard not indeed unwillingly; but the line of your discourse *is* something different.

SCÆVOLA. Then you would say that the more, Fannius, if you had been present lately in the gardens of Scipio, when there was a discussion about the Republic. What an advocate of Justice *Lælius* was then against the elaborate speech of Philus!

FANNIUS. That indeed was easy, for the justest *man* to defend justice.

SCÆVOLA. Why *should I defend* Friendship? *Is it* not easy for him, who, on account of having preserved it with the greatest fidelity, firmness and rectitude, has obtained the greatest honour?

VIII.—LÆLIUS. This is indeed to bring force against *me*. For what does it matter with what entreaty you urge me? You do urge me, at any rate. For to resist the earnest wishes of *my* sons-in-law, especially in a good matter, is both difficult and not even right. Very often, then, when I am thinking about Friendship, this especially is wont to seem worthy of consideration, viz. whether Friendship has been desired on account of weakness and poverty, so that, in giving and receiving benefits, what each was the less able to *secure* by himself, he should receive from another, and render *it* in return; or *whether* this indeed is incident to Friendship, but that *there is* another more ancient and more beautiful cause *for it* and rather proceeding from Nature herself?

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Amor enim, ex quo *amicitia* nominata, princeps est ad benevolentiam conjungendam. Nam utilitates quidem etiam ab iis percipiuntur sæpe, qui simulatione amicitiæ coluntur et observantur temporis causa. In amicitia autem nihil fictum, nihil simulatum; et, quidquid est, id verum est et voluntarium. Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius, quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione, quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura. Quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest, quæ ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus, et ab eis ita amantur, ut facile earum sensus appareat. Quod in homine multo est evidentius: primum ex ea caritate, quæ est inter natos et parentes, quæ dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest; deinde, quum similis sensus exstitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus, cujus cum moribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur. Nihil est enim amabilius virtute; nihil quod magis alliciat ad diligendum: quippe quum, propter virtutem et probitatem, eos etiam, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. Quis est, qui C. Fabricii, M'. Curii non cum caritate aliqua et benevolentia memoriam usurpet, quos numquam viderit? Quis autem est, qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Mælium non oderit? Cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia decertatum est, Pyrrho et Hannibale: ab altero propter probitatem ejus non nimis alienos animos habemus,

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For Love, from which Friendship has derived its name, is the principal *means* for cementing good feeling. For advantages are indeed often derived even from those who are courted and respected, under the pretence of Friendship, for the sake of a temporary purpose. In Friendship, however, nothing is unreal, nothing simulated, and whatever *feeling* exists, it is real and sincere. And therefore, Friendship seems to me to have sprung rather from Nature than from indigence, from an inclination of the mind, accompanied by *a* certain sense of affection, rather than from the calculation how much advantage it would involve. Of what kind indeed this is can be observed even in certain beasts, which so love their young up to a certain time, and are so loved by them, that their affection is easily apparent. And this is much more evident in the case of man; firstly from that affection which exists between children and *their* parents, *and* which cannot be destroyed except by abominable wickedness; *and* then, when a similar feeling of affection has arisen, if we have met with any one with whose character and disposition we agree, because we seem to observe in him, as it were, a certain brilliancy of uprightness and virtue. For nothing is more loveable than virtue; *there is* nothing which more entices to love; inasmuch as, on account of *their* virtue and uprightness, we love, in a certain manner, even those whom we have never seen. Who is *there* who does not cherish with some affection and kind feeling, the memory of Caius Fabricius *and* Manius Curius whom he has never seen? Who, moreover, is *there* that does not hate Tarquin the Proud, who *that does not hate* Sp. Cassius *and* Sp. Mælius? There was a struggle for empire in Italy with two leaders, Pyrrhus and Hannibal; from the one, on account of his uprightness, we have minds not very much estranged;

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alterum propter crudelitatem semper hæc civitas oderit.

IX.—Quod si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis, quos numquam vidimus, vel, quod majus est, in hoste etiam diligamus: quid mirum, si animi hominum moveantur, quum eorum, quibuscum usu conjuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur? Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adjuncta; quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis, admirabilis quædam exardescit benevolentiæ magnitudo. Quam si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, ut sit, per quem quisque assequatur, quod desideret; humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiæ, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt. Quod si ita esset: ut quisque minimum in se esse arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus: quod longe secus est. Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit, et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita judicet: ita in amicitiis expetendis colendisque maxime excellit. Quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? Minime hercle! ac ne ego quidem illius: sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis ejus, ille vicissim opinione fortasse nonnulla, quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit benevolentiam consuetudo. Sed quamquam utilitates multæ et magnæ consecutæ sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causæ diligendi profectæ.

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he other, because of his cruelty, this State will ever ate.

IX.—But if the power of uprightness is so great hat we love it, either in those whom we have never een, or, which is a greater *matter*, even in an enemy, vhat wonder *is it* if the affections of men are awakened, vhen they seem to see thoroughly the virtue and good-ess of those with whom they can be associated in ntimacy. *And* yet love is strengthened, both by kind-ess received, and by sympathy discovered, and by lose intimacy; for when these things have been ap-lied to that first emotion of the mind and affection, certain wonderful amount of benevolence is kindled. Lnd if any think that this arises from weakness, in rder that there may be *some one*, through whom every ne may obtain what he desires, they leave *us* truly a nean, and so to say, by no means dignified origin of 'riendship, which they understand to have sprung rom want and indigence. But if *this* were so, in roportion as each one thought there was the least *esource* in himself, in the same degree he would be the nost suited for Friendship; which is far from being the ase. For according as each man trusts most in himself, nd as each one is thus fortified most by virtue and visdom, so that he stands in need of no one, and judges hat all *his resources are* seated in himself, so he espe-ially excels in acquiring and cultivating Friendships. 'or why not? *Was* Africanus in need of me? No, by Iercules! And not even *was* I *in need* of him; but I *wed him*, through a certain admiration of his virtue; e, in turn, loved me, perhaps for some *good* opinion hich he had of my character. Acquaintance increased ne kindly feeling. But although many and great advan-ages have followed, nevertheless, the causes of *our* loving ne *another* did not arise from the expectation of them.

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Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamu gratiam, (neque enim beneficium feneramur, sed natur propensi ad liberalitatem sumus:) sic amicitiam no spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis ejus fructus i ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus. At ii, qu pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt, longe di sentiunt: nec mirum. Nihil enim altum, nihil mag nificum ac divinum suspicere possunt, qui suas omne cogitationes abjecerunt in rem tam humilem tamqu contemptam. Quamobrem hos quidem ab hoc sermo removeamus: ipsi autem intelligamus natura gig sensum diligendi et benevolentiæ caritatem facta sig nificatione probitatis; quam qui appetiverunt, applica sese et propius admovent, ut et usu ejus, quem dilige cœperunt, fruantur et moribus, sintque pares in amo et æquales propensioresque ad bene merendum, qua ad reposcendum. Atque hæc inter eos fit honesta ce tatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximæ capientu et erit ejus ortus a natura, quam ab imbecillitate, e gravior et verior. Nam si utilitas amicitias congl tinaret, eadem commutata dissolveret. Sed quia natu mutari non potest, idcirco veræ amicitiæ sempitern sunt.—Ortum quidem amicitiæ videtis, nisi quid a hæc forte vultis.

Fann. Tu vero perge, Læli! pro hoc enim, q minor est natu, meo jure respondeo.

Scæv. Recte tu quidem. Quamobrem audiamus.

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For as we are beneficent and liberal, not in order hat we may obtain gratitude, (for we do not trade n benefits, but are by nature inclined to liberality) eing thus attracted, not by the hope of reward, but ecause all its fruit is inherent in affection itself, we hink Friendship ought to be sought. But those who, fter the manner of brute beasts, refer everything to leasure, differ widely *from me;* and no wonder; for hey can look up to nothing exalted, nothing noble and ivine, who have squandered all their own reasonings n a subject so mean and contemptible. And there-ore, let us indeed exclude these *persons* from this dis-ourse; but let us ourselves understand that the senti-nent of love and the kindness of good feeling are born f nature, when indication of goodness has been given; nd those who have attained to this *proof of sincerity* ttach themselves and draw nearer to *one another*, so hat they may enjoy both intercourse with him whom hey have begun to love, and *his* character, and be equal n affection, and equal *in position*, and more disposed o confer favours than to demand a return. And this ecomes a noble rivalry between them. Thus, both the reatest advantages will be received from Friendship, nd its origin from Nature will be both more dignified nd more true than it *would be* from weakness. For if nterest cemented friendships, it also, when changed, vould dissolve *them.* But since Nature cannot be ltered, therefore true friendships are lasting. You erceive *now* indeed the origin of Friendship, unless ou wish, perchance, *to add* something to this.

FANNIUS. Nay, Lælius, go on; since for this *man* who is younger *than I*, I answer on my own au-hority.

SCÆVOLA. You *act* quite rightly; wherefore let us isten.

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X.—Læl. Audite ergo, optimi viri, ea, quæ sæpis sime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitæ permanere Nam vel, ut non idem expediret, incidere sæpe; vel, u de republica non idem sentiretur: mutari etiam more hominum sæpe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias ætat ingravescente. Atque earum rerum exemplum ex simi litudine capiebat ineuntis ætatis, quod summi puerorum amores sæpe una cum prætexta ponerentur; sin autem ad adolescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriæ conditionis vel commodi alicujus quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. Quod si q longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen sæpe lab factari, si in honoris contentionem incidissent: pestem enim majorem esse nullam in amicitiis, quam in pleri que pecuniæ cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque hono certamen et gloriæ; ex quo inimicitias maximas sæ inter amicissimos exstitisse. Magna enim dissidia plerumque justa nasci, quum aliquid ab amicis, qu rectum non esset, postularetur, ut aut libidinis minis aut adjutores essent ad injuriam. Quod qui recusare quamvis honeste id facerent, jus tamen amicitiæ de rere arguerentur ab iis, quibus obsequi nollent; il autem, qui quidvis ab amico auderent postul postulatione ipsa profiteri, omnia se amici ca esse facturos. Eorum querela inveteratas non m

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X.—Lælius. Listen, then, most excellent men, to those *things* which used very often to be discussed about Friendship between me and Scipio; although, indeed, he used to say that nothing was more difficult than that a Friendship should last right on to the end of life. For either it often happened that the same *thing* was not advantageous *to both*, or that the same *thing* was not thought *by them* about the State: he used often to say that the dispositions of men were also changed: sometimes by adversity, sometimes as old age became burdensome. And he used to take an example of these things from the analogy of early life, because the highest affections of boys were often laid aside at the same time with *their* prætexta; but that if they continued *their affections* to manhood, yet they were, nevertheless, sometimes severed, either by rivalry in courtship, or some *other* interest, which both could not equally secure. But if some advanced farther in Friendship, it was, nevertheless, often shattered, if they fell into competition for *some public* honour, for there was no greater bane in Friendships, than the desire for money in most *men*, *and* in all the best the struggle for honour and glory, from which the bitterest hatreds had often arisen among the greatest friends. For great disagreements, and generally just *ones* arose, when something was demanded from friends which was not right: viz. that, they should be either the ministers of lust, or abettors in injustice. And those who refused this, although they did it from a good motive, were yet accused of neglecting the claim of Friendship by those whom they were unwilling to oblige. Those, however, who ventured to demand anything they pleased from a friend, by that very demand professed that they themselves would do everything for the sake of a friend. By the complaint of these *men*, not only were very old

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familiaritates extingui solere, sed etiam odia gigni sempiterna. Hæc ita multa, quasi fata, impendere amicitiis, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiæ, sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri.

XI.—Quamobrem id primum videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. Num, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuere? Num Viscellinum amici, regnum appetentem, num Sp. Mælium debuerunt juvare? Ti. quidem Gracchum, rempublicam vexantem, a Q. Tuberone æqualibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiæ vestræ, Scævola, quum ad me, qui aderam Lænati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc, ut sibi ignoscerem, causam afferebat, quod tanti Ti. Gracchum fecisset, ut, quidquid ille vellet, sibi faciendum putaret. Tum ego, *Etiamne, si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet?* "*Numquam*, inquit, *voluisset id quidem.*" *Sed si voluisset*, "*paruissem.*" Videtis quam nefaria vox. Et hercle ita fecit; vel plus etiam quam dixit: non enim paruit ille Ti. Gracchi temeritati, sed præfuit; nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem præbuit. Itaque hac amentia, quæstione nova perterritus, in Asiam profugit, ad hostes se contulit, pœnas reipublicæ graves justasque persolvit. Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris. Nam, quum conciliatrix amicitiæ virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris.

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Friendships wont to be extinguished, but also lasting hatreds to be engendered. So many *of these* things, like fatalities, threaten Friendships, that he used to say, that to escape *them* all seemed to him *to be an indication*, not only of wisdom, but also of good fortune.

XI.—Therefore, let us first see this, if you please, how far affection ought to go in Friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, ought they to have borne arms against *their* native country with Coriolanus? *Ought his* friends *to have assisted* Viscellinus when he was grasping kingly power? Ought they to have assisted Spurius Mælius? We saw, indeed, Tiberius Gracchus, when he was troubling the state, deserted by Quintus Tubero and *other* contemporaries, *who were his* friends. But Caius Blossius, of Cumæ, the friend of your family, Scævola, when he came to me, when I was assisting the consuls Læenas and Rupilius in *their* deliberations, to sue for pardon, brought forward this plea that I should pardon him—that he esteemed Tiberius Gracchus so highly, that he thought he ought to do whatever he wished. Then *said* I, "What! even if he wished you to set fire to the Capitol?" "Never," he says, "would he have wished that indeed." "But if he had wished *it?*" "I should have obeyed." You see what an impious sentiment. And, by Hercules, he did so, or even more than he said, for he did not follow the rashness of Tiberius Gracchus, but guided *it*. And he showed himself not the companion of his madness, but *its* leader; and, consequently, through this infatuation, terrified by a fresh trial, he fled into Asia *Minor*, betook himself to *our* enemies, *and* paid heavy and deserved penalties to the state. It is therefore no excuse for a crime if you sin for the sake of a friend. For since an opinion as to *your friend's* virtue was the cause of the friendship, it is difficult for the friendship to remain, if you decline from virtue.

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Quod si rectum statuerimus, vel concedere amicis, quidquid velint, vel impetrare ab iis, quidquid velimus; perfecta quidem sapientia simus, si nihil habeat res vitii: sed loquimur de iis amicis, qui ante oculos sunt, quos vidimus, aut de quibus memoriam accepimus, quos novit vita communis. Ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime, qui ad sapientiam proxime accedunt. Videmus Papum Æmilium C. Luscino familiarem fuisse, (sic a patribus accepimus) bis una consules, collegas in censura: tum et cum iis et inter se conjunctissimos fuisse M'. Curium et T. Coruncanium memoriæ proditum est. Igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus, quemquam horum ab amico quidpiam contendisse, quod contra fidem, contra jusjurandum, contra rempublicam esset. Nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid attinet dicere, si contendisset impetraturum non fuisse? quum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, æque autem nefas sit, tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare. At vero Ti. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tunc quidem Caius frater, nunc idem acerrimus.

XII.—Hæc igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda quum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rempublicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scævola, locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oportet

But if we resolve that it is right, either to grant to *our* friends whatever they may wish, or to obtain from them whatever we may wish, we should indeed be *men* of perfect wisdom if the thing has no mischief *in it.* But we are speaking about those friends, who are before *our* eyes, whom we have seen, or concerning whom we have received tradition, whom common life is acquainted with. From this number we must take *our* examples, and especially indeed *those* who approach nearest to wisdom. We see that Papus Æmilius was intimate with Caius Luscinus (so we have learnt from *our* forefathers), *that they were* twice consuls at the same time. *and* colleagues in the censorship: it has been handed down to memory, that at that time, both with them and with one another, Manius Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius were most intimate. Therefore we cannot even suspect, that any one of these *men* demanded anything whatever from *his* friend which was opposed to *his* honour, to *his* oath, *or* to *the* state. For what need is there for *me* to say this indeed, with regard to such men, *that* if *one of them* had demanded *it*, he would not have obtained *it*, since they were most honourable men, while it is equally an impiety both to do any such a thing when asked, and to ask *it*. But yet Caius Carbo *and* Caius Cato followed Tiberius Gracchus; and at that time, indeed, Caius, *his* brother, by no means *did so*, but now *he does* most energetically.

XII.—Let this law therefore in Friendship be strictly established, that we neither demand dishonourable things, nor do *them* when asked. For the excuse is disgraceful, and by no means to be accepted, both in the case of other offences, and especially if any one confesses that he has acted against the state for the sake of *his* friend. For we have been placed in such a position, Fannius and Scævola, that we ought to foresee afar off

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futuros casus reipublicæ. Deflexit enim jam aliquantulum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo majorum. Ti. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est; vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses. Num quid simile populus Romanus audierat aut viderat? Hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P. Scipione effecerint, sine lacrimis non queo dicere. Nam Carbonem, quoquo modo potuimus, propter recentem pœnam Ti. Gracchi sustinuimus. De C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid exspectem, non libet augurari. Serpit deinde res, quæ proclivius ad perniciem, quum semel cœpit, labitur. Videtis, in tabella jam ante quanta sit facta labes primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia. Videre jam videor populum a senatu disjunctum, multitudinisque arbitrio res maximas agi. Plures enim discent quemadmodum hæc fiant, quam quemadmodum his resistatur. Quorsum hæc? Quia sine sociis nemo quidquam tale conatur. Præcipiendum est igitur bonis, ut, si in ejusmodi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se alligatos, ut ab amicis in re publica peccantibus non discedant: improbis autem pœna statuenda est: nec vero minor iis, qui secuti erunt alterum, quam iis, qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces. Quis clarior in Græcia Themistocle? quis potentior? Qui quum imperator bello Persico servitute Græciam liberasset propterque invidiam in

future calamities of the state. For the custom of *our* ancestors has already somewhat swerved from *its* course and career. Tiberius Gracchus endeavoured to grasp kingly power, or *rather*, he even reigned a few months. Had the Roman people *ever* heard or seen anything like *it?* I cannot mention, without tears, what *his* friends and relations who followed this *man*, even since his death, have done, with regard to P. Scipio. For we withstood Carbo, in whatever way we could, on account of the recent punishment of T. Gracchus. With regard to the tribuneship of C. Gracchus, however, what I anticipate *I* am not disposed to forebode. In the next place, a movement is creeping on, which glides more swiftly to destruction when it has once begun. You see, in the ballot already beforehand, what great mischief has been done; first, by the Gabinian Law, and two years afterwards by the Cassian. Already I seem to behold the people separated from the senate, and the most important matters managed by the will of the multitude. For more *men* will learn how these things come to pass, than how they can be resisted. To what end *do I speak* thus? Because without associates no one attempts anything of the sort. We must instruct good *men*, therefore, that, if they should unawares fall by any chance into Friendships of such a sort, not to consider themselves bound in such a way, that they may not depart from *their* friends when they do wrong with respect to the state. For the unprincipled, however, punishment ought to be enacted, and, in truth, a not less *one* for those who have followed another, than for those who have themselves been the leaders in impiety. Who *was* more distinguished in Greece than Themistocles? Who more powerful? Who, when, as commander in the Persian war he had freed Greece from subjection, and through jealousy had been

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exsilium missus esset, ingratæ patriæ injuriam non tulit, quam ferre debuit. Fecit idem, quod XX annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. His adjutor contra patriam inventus est nemo: itaque mortem sibi uterque conscivit. Quare talis improborum consensio non modo excusatione amicitiæ tegenda non est, sed potius omni supplicio vindicanda, ut ne quis [sibi] concessum putet, amicum vel bellum patriæ inferentem sequi. Quod quidem, ut res cœpit ire, haud scio, an aliquando futurum sit. Mihi autem non minori curæ est, qualis respublica post mortem meam futura sit, quam qualis hodie sit.

XIII.—Hæc igitur prima lex amicitiæ sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus; amicorum causa honesta faciamus; ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogemur: studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit; consilium vero dare gaudeamus libere. Plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit; et adhibitæ pareatur. Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Græcia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quædam: (sed nihil est, quod illi non persequantur suis argutiis:) partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus: satis superque esse suarum cuique rerum; alienis nimis implicari molestum esse: commodissimum esse, quam laxissimas habenas habere

sent into exile, did not endure the injustice of *his* ungrateful country, which he ought to have endured. He did the same *thing*, which twenty years previously Coriolanus had done among us. No one was found as a helper to these *men* against *their* country, and so each *of them* committed suicide. Therefore, such an agreement of unprincipled *men* ought not only not to be protected by the excuse of Friendship, but rather visited with every punishment, that no one may think it permitted him to follow even a friend when making war on *his* country. But this, indeed, as matters begin to tend, I rather think will some day happen. To me, however, it is not a less matter of anxiety, of what character the state will become after my death, than what it is to-day.

XIII.—Let this then be established as the first law of Friendship, viz. that we seek honourable *things* from *our* friends; *and that* we do honourable *things* for the sake of *our* friends; that we do not indeed delay until we are asked; *that* zeal be ever present, *that* hesitation be absent; but *that we* delight to give advice freely. Especially in Friendship let the influence of friends who give good advice, have weight, and let it both be employed for warning, not only openly, but also sharply, if the occasion shall demand; and let it be obeyed when *thus* employed. For by some *men*, who, I hear, have been considered wise in Greece, I think strange *notions* have been approved: (but there is nothing which they do not follow with their own subtlety,) in part that too close friendships should be avoided, that it be not necessary that one should be anxious for many; that each *man* has enough and more *than enough* of his own affairs; that to be too much mixed up with other persons' *concerns* is troublesome; that it is most convenient to hold as loosely as possible the reins

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amicitiæ: quas vel adducas, quum velis, vel remittas. Caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem; qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus. Alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius, (quem locum breviter perstrinxi paullo ante:) præsidii adjumentique causa, non benevolentiæ neque caritatis, amicitias esse expetendas. Itaque, ut quisque minimum firmitatis habeat minimumque virium, ita amicitias appetere maxime. Ex eo fieri, ut mulierculæ magis amicitiarum præsidia quærant, quam viri, et inopes, quam opulenti et calamitosi, quam beati. O præclaram sapientiam! Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt: qua nihil a diis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil jucundius. Quæ est enim ista securitas? Specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda. Neque enim est consentaneum, ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. Quod si curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quæ necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit; ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, ignaviam fortitudo. Itaque videas rebus injustis justos maxime dolere, imbellibus fortes, flagitiosis modestos. Ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et lætari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis. Quamobrem si cadit in sapientem animi dolor; (qui profecto cadit, nisi ex ejus animo exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur:) quæ causa est, cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas

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of Friendship, which you can either tighten, when you wish, or slacken. For that freedom from care is the chief thing towards living happily, which the mind cannot enjoy if one *man* is, as it were, in labour for many. But they say that others affirm even much more unfeelingly (a topic which I briefly touched upon a short time ago), that Friendships should be sought for the sake of protection and assistance, not of good feeling and affection; consequently, the less strength of character, and the less of resources a man has, the more he seeks Friendships. From this it comes to pass that feeble women seek the protection of Friendships more than men, and the poor men, the sick, and the unfortunate, rather than the happy. O surpassing Wisdom! For they seem to banish the sun from the universe who banish Friendship from life, than which we receive nothing better from the immortal gods, nothing more pleasant. For what is that freedom from care? Pleasant indeed in appearance, but in reality to be rejected on many points. For it is not even becoming either not to undertake any honest business or action, lest you should be troubled, or to lay *it* aside when undertaken. For if we *intend to* avoid care, we must flee from Virtue, which necessarily, with some care, despises and hates things opposed to herself; as goodness *despises and abhors* wickedness; temperance, lust; bravery, cowardice. Thus you may see just men grieving most at unjust deeds, brave men at cowardly *ones*, modest *men* at disgraceful *ones*. This then is characteristic of a well constituted mind, viz. both to rejoice at good things and to grieve at the contrary. Therefore, if grief of mind falls to the wise *man* (which falls to *him* undoubtedly, unless we suppose human feeling eradicated from his mind), what is the reason why we entirely banish Friendship from life, lest we should

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propter eam suscipiamus molestias? Quid enim interest, motu animi sublato, non dico inter hominem et pecudem, sed inter hominem et saxum aut truncum aut quidvis generis ejusdem? Neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream quamdam volunt: quæ quidem est quum multis in rebus, tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur. Quamobrem angor iste qui pro amico sæpe capiendus est, non tantum valet, ut tollat e vita amicitiam; non plus, quam ut virtutes, quia nonnullas curas et molestias afferunt, repudientur.

XIV.—Quum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se similis animus applicet et adjungat: id quum contingit, amor exoriatur necesse est. Quid enim tam absurdum, quam delectari multis inanibus rebus, ut honore, ut gloria, ut ædificio, ut vestitu cultuque corporis; animo autem virtute prædito, eo, qui vel amare, vel, ut ita dicam, redamare possit, non admodum delectari? Nihil est enim remuneratione benevolentiæ, nihil vicissitudine studiorum officiorumque jucundius. Quod si etiam illud addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse, quod ad se rem ullam tam alliciat et tam attrahat, quam ad amicitiam similitudo; concedetur profecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant, adsciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate conjunctos atque natura. Nihil est enim appetentius similium sui, nihil rapacius, quam natura. Quamobrem hoc quidem, Fanni, et Scævola, constat, ut

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undergo some trouble on account of it? For what is the difference, if the emotions of the soul are taken away, I say not between a man and a beast, but between a man and a rock, or a trunk *of a tree*, or anything of the same sort? For those are not to be listened to who desire a kind of virtue *that is* hard and, as it were, steeled, which is indeed, both in many things, and *especially* in Friendship, gentle and yielding, so that it is both expanded, as it were, by the prosperity of a friend, and contracted by *his* misfortunes. Consequently, that anxiety which must often be felt for a friend, is not strong enough to take away Friendship from life, any more than that virtues, because they bring with *them* some cares and troubles, should be repudiated.

XIV.—Since however *it* cements Friendship, as I have said above, if any indication of virtue is manifested to which a similar disposition may attach and unite itself, when that happens, it is necessary that affection should arise. For what *is* so absurd as to be delighted with many unreal things, as honour, as glory, as a building, as the clothing and adornment of the body; but not to be greatly delighted with a mind endued with virtue, with one which can either love, or, as I may say, love in return? For nothing is more delightful than the reward of benevolence, nothing more pleasant than the interchange of kind feelings and good offices. And if we also add this, which can rightly be added, that there is nothing which so allures and so attracts to itself any *other* thing as congeniality of sentiment *allures* to Friendship, it will be conceded at once that it is true that the good love the good, and attach *them* to themselves, as though connected by relationship and Nature. For nothing is more desirous of *things* like itself, nothing more greedy than Nature. Wherefore this indeed, Fannius and Scævola, is agreed, as I

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opinor, bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam benevolentiam esse: qui est amicitiæ fons a natura constitutus. Sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet. Non est enim inhumana virtus neque immunis neque superba: quæ etiam populos universos tueri, eisque optime consulere soleat; quod non faceret profecto, si a caritate vulgi abhorreret. Atque etiam mihi quidem videntur, qui utilitatis causa fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum amicitiæ tollere. Non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum, quam amici amor ipse delectat; tumque illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum, jucundum, si cum studio est profectum: tantumque abest, ut amicitiæ propter indigentiam colantur, ut ii, qui opibus et copiis maximeque virtute præditi, in quis plurimum est præsidii, minime alterius indigeant, liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi. Atque haud scio, an ne opus sit quidem, nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. Ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra, nec domi nec militiæ, Scipio eguisset? Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam consecuta est.

XV.—Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. Nam quis est pro deûm fidem atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam, nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? Hæc est enim tyrannorum vita, in qua

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suppose, that among good *men* benevolence towards the good is, as it were, essential; and this has been constituted by Nature the fountain-head of Friendship. But the same goodness also belongs to a number *of people*. For virtue is not unfeeling, nor regardless of obligations, nor haughty, since she is accustomed to protect even whole nations and consult their best interests, which she would assuredly not do, if she shrank from affection for the common people. And again, even *those* appear to me to take away the most pleasing bond of Friendship who pretend that Friendships *exist* for the sake of expediency. For the advantage obtained through a friend does not give so much pleasure as the love itself of a friend. And then that which has proceeded from a friend becomes delightful, if it has proceeded with affection; and it is so far from *being the case* that Friendships are cultivated through need, that those who, *being* endowed with means and resources, and especially with virtue, in which *there is* the greatest stronghold, are least *of all* in need of another, are the most liberal and the most benevolent. And I rather think it is not even necessary that nothing should be ever wanting *to our* friends. For wherein would our affections have flourished, if Scipio had never needed *my* advice, never *my* help, either at home or in the field? Therefore Friendship *did* not *follow* advantage, but advantage followed Friendship.

XV.—Persons therefore revelling in luxury must not be heard if at any time they shall dispute about Friendship, which they have understood neither in practice nor theory. For who is *there*, by the faith of gods and men, who is willing, on condition that he may neither love any one, nor himself be loved by any one, to abound in all resources and to live in abundance of all things? For this is the life of tyrants, in which

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nimirum nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolentiæ potest esse fiducia; omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita: nullus locus amicitiæ. Quis enim aut eum diligat, quem metuat; aut eum, a quo se metui putet? Coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus. Quod si forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderint; tum intelligitur, quam fuerint inopes amicorum. Quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt, tum [exsulantem] se intellexisse, quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, quum jam neutris gratiam referre posset. Quamquam miror, illa superbia et importunitate si quemquam habere potuit. Atque ut hujus, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare non potuere: sic multorum opes præpotentium excludunt amicitias fideles. Non enim solum ipsa fortuna cæca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit cæcos, quos complexa est. Itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia: neque quidquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos, qui antea commodis fuerunt moribus, imperio, potestate, prosperis rebus immutari, spernique ab his veteres amicitias, indulgeri novis. Quid autem stultius, quam, quum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quæ parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa; amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitæ, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? Etenim cetera quum parant, cui parent, nesciunt, nec cujus causa laborent:—ejus est enim istorum quidque, qui vincit viribus:—amici-

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certainly no confidence, no affection, no firm reliance in *their* benevolence can exist; everything *is* always mistrusted and fraught with anxiety, *and there is* no place for Friendship. For who can either love him whom he fears, or him, by whom he may think he is feared? They are however courted with the *mere* pretence *of friendship* only for a time. For if, perchance, as often happens, they shall have fallen; then it is understood how destitute of friends they have been. And this they relate that Tarquin said, that then, being an exile, he understood whom he had as faithful friends, whom unfaithful *ones*, since at that time he could repay kindness to neither. Although I am surprised that, with such arrogance and want of consideration, he could have any *friend*. And as the character of this *man*, whom I have mentioned, could not procure *him* true friends, so the riches of many over-powerful *men* shut out faithful Friendships. For fortune is not only blind herself, but she also often renders those blind whom she has embraced. Consequently, they are generally carried away by disdain and haughtiness, nor can anything become more intolerable than a rich fool. And this indeed *we* may see, that those who were before of pleasing manners, are changed by military command, by magisterial authority, by prosperity; and old friendships are despised by them, *and* new ones indulged in. But what is more foolish than, when *men* possess very great influence through riches, abilities, *and* resources, to procure other things which are procured for money,—horses, slaves, gorgeous raiment, *and* costly vases, *but* not to procure friends, to use a metaphor, the best and most beautiful furniture of life? For when they procure other *things*, they know not for whom they procure *them*, nor for whose sake they labour,—for each of these *things* belongs to him who excels in power;—of Friend-

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tiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio: ut, etiam si illa maneant, quæ sunt quasi dona fortunæ, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse jucunda. Sed hæc hactenus.

XVI.—Constituendi sunt autem, qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi. De quibus tres video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo; unam, ut eodem modo erga amicos affecti simus, quo erga nosmetipsos; alteram, ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiæ pariter æqualiterque respondeat; tertiam, ut, quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis. Harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus assentior. Nec enim illa *prima* vera est, ut, quemadmodum in se quisque, sic in amicum sit animatus. Quam multa enim, quæ nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus causa amicorum, precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum acerbius in aliquem invehi, insectarique vehementius; quæ in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime: multæque res sunt, in quibus de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur, ut iis amici potius, quam ipsi fruantur. *Altera* sententia est, quæ definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. Hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. Divitior mihi et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare restricte, ne plus reddat, quam acceperit. Neque enim verendum est, ne quid excidat, aut

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ships one's possession remains sure and certain to each. So that, even if those *things* remain, which are, as it were, gifts of fortune, yet life unadorned and deserted by friends cannot be pleasant. But of this enough.

XVI.—Moreover, we must determine what are the limits of Friendship and, as it were, the boundaries of affection. And, concerning these, I observe that three opinions are stated, of not one of which I approve. First, that we should be disposed towards *our* friends in the same way as towards ourselves; the second, that our goodwill towards *our* friends should correspond equally and exactly to their goodwill towards us; the third, that at what price each one values himself, at so much should he be valued by *his* friends. With none at all of these three opinions do I concur. For neither is that first *one* true, that as each one *is disposed* towards himself, so he should be disposed towards *his* friend. For how many *things*, which for our own sakes we should never do, we do for the sake of *our* friends, beg from the unworthy, supplicate from them, then inveigh over-bitterly against some one, and rail at *him* over-vehemently. What in our *own* affairs *are done* not quite honourably, are done in *the affairs* of *our* friends most honourably; and there are many matters in which good men detract much from their own advantages, and suffer *them* to be withdrawn, so that *their* friends enjoy them rather than themselves. The second opinion is *that* which limits friendships by reciprocal kind actions and wishes. This, indeed, is to call Friendship to a reckoning too minutely and meanly,—that the proportion of *benefits* given and received may be equal. Richer and more opulent does true Friendship appear to me to be, and not to calculate closely lest it give back more than it has received; for neither should *we* be afraid lest anything be lost or

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ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne plus æquo in amicitiam congeratur. *Tertius* vero ille finis deterrimus, ut, quanti, quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. Sæpe enim in quibusdam aut animus abjectior est, aut spes amplificandæ fortunæ fractior. Non est igitur amici, talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est; sed potius eniti et efficere, ut amici jacentem animum excitet inducatque spem cogitationemque meliorem. Alius igitur finis veræ amicitiæ constituendus est, si prius, quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit, edixero. Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiæ potuisse reperiri, quam ejus, qui dixisset ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus: nec vero se adduci posse, ut hoc, quemadmodum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem; impuri cujusdam, aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? Quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare, ut quam sæpissime peccet amicus, quo plures det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum: rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi, dolere, invidere. Quare hoc quidem præceptum, cujuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet. Illud potius præcipiendum fuit ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse possemus.

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lest anything fall to the ground, or lest more than is fair be heaped upon Friendship. But that third limitation is the worst; viz. that each one should be valued by his friends at the *price* which he estimates himself; for often in some either *their* spirit is too weak, or *their* hope of increasing *their* fortune too much broken. It is not, therefore, the *mark* of a friend to be such towards him, as he is towards himself, but rather to endeavour and take measures, that he may rouse up the dejected spirit of *his* friend, and induce a better hope and way of thinking. Another definition, therefore, of true Friendship, must be resolved on, as soon as I shall have stated what Scipio was accustomed especially to blame. He used to declare that no saying more injurious to Friendship could have been found, than *that* of him, who had said that *one* ought so to love as if, some time or other, he would hate; but that he could not be induced to believe that this, as it was thought, was said by Bias, who had been considered a wise man, one of "The Seven," *but* that it was the sentiment of some vile or intriguing *man*, or of *one who* looked at all *things* with reference to his own power. For how will any one be able to be a friend *to him*, whose enemy he will think he may become? Nay, further, it will be necessary to wish and desire, that a friend may do wrong as often as possible, in order that he may afford him the more handles, so to say, for reproving *him;* but, on the other hand, it will be necessary to be vexed, to be sorry, to be filled with envy at the right actions and advantages of *his* friends. Wherefore this precept, indeed, whosesoever it is, is enough to take away Friendship. This precept should rather have been taught, that we should employ such diligence in forming friendships, that we should never begin to love him whom we may some day hate.

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Quin etiam si minus felices in deligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius, quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.

XVII.—His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, quum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas: ut, etiam si qua fortuna acciderit, ut minus justæ amicorum voluntates adjuvandæ sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum sit de via; modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur: est enim, quatenus amicitiæ dari venia possit. Nec vero negligenda est fama; nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium: quam blanditiis et assentando colligere turpe est. Virtus quam sequitur caritas, minime repudianda est. Sed sæpe (etenim redeo ad Scipionem, cujus omnis sermo erat de amicitia) querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent: capras et oves quot quisque haberet, dicere posse: amicos quot haberet, non posse dicere! et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis negligentes esse nec habere quasi signa quædam et notas, quibus eos, qui ad amicitiam essent idonei, judicarent. Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi; cujus generis est magna penuria: et judicare difficile est sane, nisi expertum; experiendum est autem in ipsa amicitia. Ita præcurrit amicitia judicium, tollitque experiendi potestatem.

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esides, if we should be less fortunate in choosing *a* ·*iend*, Scipio thought that that ought rather to be ndured, than that it should be thought an occasion for nmities.

XVII.—These limitations, therefore, I think *we* must mploy, that both the character of friends may be lameless, and that there may be among them an interhange of all things, of plans, of wishes, without any xception, that, even if by any chance it should happen hat the less just wishes of *our* friends have to be upported, in which either their life or reputation is at take, we must deviate from the *ordinary* course, proided that the highest disgrace does not follow; for here is *a point* as far as which pardon may be exended to Friendship. But reputation must not be .eglected, nor ought *we* to think the goodwill of our ellow citizens an unimportant instrument for the con.uct of public affairs, which it is disgraceful to acquire ·y blandishments and flattery. The virtue, which ffection follows, must by no means be rejected. But ften (for I return to Scipio, whose whole discourse vas about Friendship) he used to complain, that in all *ther* matters men were more earnest; that how many ;oats and sheep each one has, he can say, how many riends he has, he cannot say; and that in obtaining hese indeed they employ care, *but* in choosing *their* riends they are negligent, nor have they, as it were, ertain signs and marks by which they may judge of hose who are fit for friendship. The firm, steadfast, nd trustworthy therefore ought to be chosen, of which cind there is great lack, and for *a man* to judge is ruly difficult, except for an experienced *one;* but the xperience must be gained in Friendship itself. Consequently, the friendship forestalls the judgment, nd takes away the power of gaining experience.

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Est igitur prudentis sustinere, ut currum, sic impetum benevolentiæ, quo utamur, quasi equis tentatis, sic amicitiis aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. Quidam sæpe in parva pecunia perspiciuntur, quam sint leves; quidam, quos parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna. Sin vero erunt aliqui reperti, qui pecuniam præferre amicitiæ sordidum existiment; ubi eos inveniemus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes amicitiæ non anteponant, ut quum ex altera parte proposita hæc sint, ex altera jus amicitiæ, non multo illa malint? Imbecilla est enim natura ad contemnendam potentiam: quam etiam si neglecta amicitia consecuti sunt, obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. Itaque veræ amicitiæ difficillime reperiuntur in iis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur. Ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo? Quid? hæc ut omittam, quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates! ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendat. Quamquam Ennius recte:

> Amicus certus in re incerta cérnitur:

tamen hæc duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt, aut in malis deserunt.

XVIII.—Qui igitur utraque in re gravem, constantem, stabilem se in amicitia præstiterit, hunc ex maxime raro hominum genere judicare debemus et pæne divina

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It is therefore *the duty* of a prudent man so to hold in check *his* impulse to benevolence as *he would* a chariot, that we may use friendships just as tried horses, the characters of *our* friends having been in some way put to the test. Some *men* are often seen through in *the case* of a small sum of money how worthless they are; some, whom a small *amount* could not affect, are recognised in a great *one*. But if some indeed will be found who think it sordid to prefer money to Friendship, where shall we find those who do not prefer honours, civil offices, military commands, influence, *and* riches to Friendship, so that, when these things have been offered on the one hand, *and* the law of Friendship on the other, they do not much prefer these? For *human* nature is *too* weak to despise power; and even if they have obtained this by neglecting Friendship, they think *their conduct* will be overlooked, because Friendship has not been neglected without great reason. Consequently, true friendships are with great difficulty found among those who are engaged in high offices and affairs of State; for where would you find that *man*, who would prefer the advancement of *his* friend to his own? Why, to omit this, how troublesome, how difficult to most *men* seems the sharing of *others'* misfortunes! and to these it is not easy to find *one* who would descend. And yet though Ennius rightly *says*,—

"A certain friend is seen in an uncertain matter,"

nevertheless, these two *things* convict most *men* of worthlessness and weakness, either if they despise *them* in prosperity, or neglect *them* in adversity.

XVIII.—*He*, therefore, who shall have shown himself in both circumstances trustworthy, constant, firm in Friendship, this *man* we ought to consider of an especially rare kind of men, and almost superhuman.

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Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiæque ejus, quam in amicitia quærimus, fides est. Nihil enim stabile est, quod infidum. Simplicem præterea et communem et consentientem, qui rebus iisdem moveatur, eligi par est: quæ omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem. Neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum; neque vero, qui non eisdem rebus movetur et natura consentit, fidus aut stabilis potest esse. Addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis: quæ omnia pertinent ad eam, quam jamdudum tracto, constantiam. Ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam, nisi inter bonos, esse non posse. Est enim boni viri, quem eumdem sapientem licet dicere, hæc duo tenere in amicitia: primum, ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse, magis ingenui est, quam fronte occultare sententiam: deinde, non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum, semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum. Accedat huc suavitas quædam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiæ. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas, habet illa quidem gravitatem; sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.

XIX. — Exsistit autem hoc loco quædam quæstio sub-difficilis: num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut

But the foundation of that firmness and constancy which we seek in Friendship, is good faith; for nothing is enduring which is unreliable. Moreover, it is proper that *one* should be chosen *as a friend who is* genuine, sociable, and congenial, *and* who is influenced by the same circumstances; all which *qualities* pertain to faithfulness. For neither can a complex and tortuous character be reliable, nor, indeed, can *he* who is not affected by the same circumstances, and does *not* agree in natural disposition, be faithful or firm. To the same *purpose we* must add that *we* ought neither to take pleasure in bringing forward accusations, nor to believe *them* when they have been urged. And all these belong to that constancy of which I have some time been treating. Consequently, that becomes true which I said at the beginning, that Friendship cannot exist except between the good. For it is *characteristic* of a good man, whom we may also call a wise man, to maintain these two *points* in *his* friendship: first, that there be nothing feigned or pretended; for even to hate openly is more *characteristic* of a gentleman, than to hide by *his* countenance *his real* opinion; secondly, not only to repel accusations brought by any one against *his friend*, but to be not even himself suspicious, always imagining that something wrong has been done by *his* friend. To these it is right *that* a certain pleasantness of speech and manner should be added, a by no means unimportant spice to Friendship. Sternness, however, and strictness in every matter, has *in it* indeed impressiveness; but Friendship ought to be more indulgent and free and pleasant, and more disposed to all courtesy and affability.

XIX.—*There* arises, however, in this place, a somewhat difficult question, whether at any time new friends, worthy of Friendship, should be preferred to old *ones*, as

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equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus. Indigna homine dubitatio! Non enim amicitiarum debent esse, sicut aliarum rerum satietates. Veterrimæ quæque, ut ea vina, quæ vetustatem ferunt, esse debent suavissima: verumque illud est, quod dicitur, *multos modios salis simul edendos esse*, ut amicitiæ munus expletum sit. Novitates autem, si spem afferunt, ut, tamquam in herbis non fallacibus, fructus appareat, non sunt illæ quidem repudiandæ; vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda est. Maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Quin ipso equo, cujus modo mentionem feci, si nulla res impediat nemo est, qui non eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur, quam intractato et novo: nec vero in hoc, quod est animal, sed in iis etiam, quæ sunt inanimata, consuetudo valet; quum locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus. Sed maximum est in amicitia, superiorem parem esse inferiori; sæpe enim excellentiæ quædam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis. Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum, omnino sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat ætate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnes per se esse ampliores volebat. Quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus: ut, si quam præstantiam virtutis, ingenii, fortunæ consecuti sunt, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis; ut, si

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we are accustomed to prefer young horses to old *ones*. Doubt unworthy of man! For there ought not to be satiety of friendships as of other things. The oldest friendships, like those wines which bear long keeping, ought to be the pleasantest, and the saying is true "that many pecks of salt must be eaten together, that the task of Friendship may be completed." But *as to* novelties,—if they bring hope that, as in plants which do not disappoint, fruit will appear,—they indeed must not be rejected; nevertheless, the old friendship must be preserved in its own place. For the power of antiquity and custom is very great. Nay, even in the matter of the horse itself, of which I have just now made mention, if no circumstance hinder, there is no one who does not more gladly use that to which he is accustomed, than *one* unbroken and strange. And not only in *the case* of this, which is an animal, but in those *things* also which are inanimate, is habit strong; since we are delighted with places themselves, even mountainous and woody, in which we *have* dwelt for a considerable time. But it is of the greatest importance in Friendship that the superior be on a level with the inferior; for there are often certain excellences *in a man*, such as was *that* of Scipio in our flock, so to say. Never did he set himself before Philus, never *before* Rupilius, never *before* Mummius, never *before his* friends of lower rank. Q. Maximus, indeed, *his* brother, an admirable man, but on the whole by no means equal to himself, because he was *his* senior in age, he used to respect as his superior, and wished all his *friends* to be more honoured on account of himself. And this should be done and imitated by all, so that, if they have attained any pre-eminence in virtue, ability, *and* fortune, they may impart these to their own *friends* and share *them* with *those* nearest *to them;* that, if

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parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant imbecilliores vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes, eisque honori sint et dignitati: ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerint, quum cogniti sunt, et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores, quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt. Quod multo profecto magis in veris patribus certisque faciendum. Fructus enim ingenii et virtutis omnisque præstantiæ tum maximus capitur, quum in proximum quemque confertur.

XX.—Ut igitur ii, qui sunt in amicitiæ conjunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exæquare se cum inferioribus debent: sic inferiores non dolere, se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari. Quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant: eoque magis, si habere se putant, quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo factum queant dicere. Odiosum sane genus hominum, officia exprobrantium: quæ meminisse debet is, in quem collata sunt, non commemorare, qui contulit. Quamobrem ut ii, qui superiores sunt, summittere se debent in amicitia sic quodam modo inferiores extollere. Sunt enim quidam, qui molestas amicitias faciunt, quum ipsi se contemni putant; quod non fere contingit, nisi iis, qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur; qui hac opinione non modo verbis,

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hey have been born of humble parents, if they have elations weaker *than themselves*, either in spirit or ortune, they may increase their means, and be to them n honour and dignity; as in myths, *those*, who, for ome time, on account of ignorance of *their* origin and *heir* race, have been in servitude, when they have be-ome known, and found *to be* sons either of gods or ings, retain nevertheless *their* affection for the shep-erds, whom they supposed for many years to be *their* athers. And this surely ought much more to be done n *the case of* real and undoubted fathers. For the fruit f talent and virtue and of all superiority is then athered most plenteously, when it is conferred on all hose nearest *to us*.

XX.—As therefore those, who are the superiors in he relationship of Friendship and union, ought to lace themselves on a level with *their* inferiors; so the nferiors *ought* not to grieve, that they are surpassed y their own *friends* either in ability, or fortune, or lignity. And most of these are either always com-laining of something, or even upbraiding; and the nore so, if they think they have *something* which they an say has been done *by them* courteously and in a riendly manner, and with some trouble on their own part. Hateful, in truth, *is* the class of persons who ffensively put forward *their* services! which he on whom hey have been conferred ought to remember, not *he* who conferred *them* to mention. Wherefore, as those who are the superiors, ought to humble themselves in friendship, so, in a certain way, *they ought* to elevate *their* inferiors. For there are some *persons* who make friendships annoying, when they think that they them-selves are slighted, and this scarcely ever happens, except to those who also consider that they deserve to be slighted; and these ought to be freed from this opinion,

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sed etiam opere levandi sunt. Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum, quantum ipse efficere possis: deinde etiam, quantum ille, quem diligas atque adjuves, sustinere. Non enim tu possis, quamvis licet excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere: ut Scipio P. Rupilium potuit consulem efficere, fratrem ejus Lucium non potuit. Quod si etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen, quid ille possit sustinere. Omnino amicitiæ corroboratis jam confirmatisque et ingeniis et ætatibus, judicandæ sunt: nec, si qui ineunte ætate venandi aut pilæ studiosi fuerint, eos habere necessarios oportet, quos tum eodem studio præditos dilexerunt. Isto enim modo nutrices et pædagogi jure vetustatis plurimum benevolentiæ postulabunt: qui negligendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam modo. Aliter amicitiæ stabiles permanere non possunt. Dispares enim mores disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias: nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse, morum studiorumque distantia. Recte etiam præcipi potest in amicitiis, ne intemperata quædam benevolentia, quod persæpe fit, impediat magnas utilitates amicorum. Nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Trojam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, si Lycomedem, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impedientem audire voluisset. Et sæpe incidunt magnæ res, ut discedendum sit ab amicis: quas qui impedire vult, quod desiderium non facile

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ot only by words, but also by deed. But so much ught to be bestowed upon each, first, as you yourself nay be able to effect; secondly, also *as much* as he whom you love and assist *can* support. For you may not be able, although you may be in a high position, o raise all your *friends* to the highest honours; as Scipio was able to make P. Rupilius consul, but not his brother Lucius. But even if you may be able o confer anything you wish on another, nevertheless you must see what he can bear. On the whole, a decision must be made about friendships when both the character and the age *of the friends* have become strengthened and settled; nor, if any in early age have been fond of hunting or of the ball, need they retain, as intimate friends, those whom at that time they liked, because they were endued with the same tastes. For in that way nurses and pedagogues, by right of long acquaintance, will demand very much kind feeling; and these must not indeed be neglected, but *treated* in some other way; otherwise Friendships cannot remain firm. For different dispositions follow different pursuits, and unlikeness in these severs Friendships, and not for any other reason can the good not be friendly to the bad, *and* the bad to the good, except that the difference of dispositions and tastes is as great between them as the greatest can be. It may also rightly be prescribed in Friendships that not any unregulated affection, as very often happens, should be an obstacle to the great interests of friends. For neither, to revert to mythology, could Neoptolemus have taken Troy if he had been willing to listen to Lycomedes, at whose court he had been brought up, *and who*, with many tears, was trying to prevent his departure. And often important events happen so that we must depart from *our* friends; and he who wishes to prevent these, because he could not easily

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ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura, et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum justus. Atque in omni re considerandum est, et quid postules ab amico, et quid patiare a te impetrari.

XXI.—Est etiam quasi quædam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis nonnumquam necessaria: jam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad vulgares amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. Erumpunt sæpe vitia amicorum quum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos; quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. Tales igitur amicitiæ sunt remissione usus eluendæ, et, ut Catonem dicere audivi, dissuendæ magis, quam discindendæ; nisi quædam admodum intolerabilis injuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit neque fieri possit, ut non statim alienatio disjunctioque facienda sit. Sin autem morum aut studiorum commutatio quædam, ut fieri solet, facta erit, aut in reipublicæ partibus dissensio intercesserit: (loquor enim jam, ut paullo ante dixi, non de sapientium, sed de communibus amicitiis:) cavendum erit, ne non solum amicitiæ depositæ, sed inimicitiæ etiam susceptæ videantur. Nihil enim turpius, quam cum eo bellum gerere, quicum familiariter vixeris. Ab amicitia Q. Pompeii meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem, quæ erat in republica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello. Utrumque egit graviter, auctoritate et offensione animi non acerba. Quamobrem primum danda opera est,

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ar the separation, he is both weak and feeble by
.ture, and for that very reason by no means reason-
le in Friendship. And in every circumstance *you*
ust consider, both what you should require from a
iend, and what you should allow to be obtained from
ou.

XXI.—There is also, as it were, a kind of catastrophe
the severing of Friendships sometimes unavoidable:
r now our discourse descends from the intimacies of
e wise to common-place Friendships. The faults of
iends frequently break out, now against *their* friends
emselves, now against strangers; nevertheless their
sgrace flows back upon *their* friends. Therefore, such
riendships should be got rid of by interruption of in-
rcourse, and, as I have heard Cato used to say, rather
e severed by unstitching than suddenly rent; unless
me very intolerable injustice has broken out, so that
is neither right nor honest, and cannot happen that
e estrangement and disunion should not forthwith
e produced. But if any change of character or
stes, as is accustomed to take place, has happened,
r disagreement in political partisanship has occurred
for I speak now, as I spoke a little while ago, not
f the Friendships of the wise, but of common-place
riendships), care must be taken lest, not only Friend-
hips may seem to be laid aside, but also enmities
ngendered. For nothing is more disgraceful than to
age war with him, with whom you have lived on
amiliar terms. From his Friendship with Q. Pompey,
n my account, Scipio had withdrawn himself, as you
now; but because of the disagreement which there
as in the State, he was estranged from our col-
eague Metellus. He acted in both cases with dignity,
vith a regard to his position, and with no bitter ex-
speration of mind. Wherefore, in the first place,

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ne qua amicorum discidia fiant: sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut exstinctæ potius amicitiæ, quam oppressæ esse videantur. Cavendum vero, ne etiam in graves inimicitias convertant se amicitiæ; ex quibus jurgia, maledicta, contumeliæ gignuntur. Quæ tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendæ sunt: et hic honos veteri amicitiæ tribuendus est, ut is in culpa sit, qui faciat, non qui patiatur injuriam. Omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis cito diligere incipiant neve non dignos. Digni autem sunt amicitia, quibus in ipsis inest causa, cur diligantur. Rarum genus! et quidem omnia præclara rara, nec quidquam difficilius, quam reperire, quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum. Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quidquam bonum nôrunt, nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos, tamquam pecudes, eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos. Ita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali carent amicitia, per se et propter se expetenda, nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, hæc vis amicitiæ qualis et quanta sit. Ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suæ, sed quod per se sibi quisque carus est. Quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus numquam reperietur. Est enim is quidem tamquam alter idem. Quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus, nantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, feris, primum ut se ipsæ diligant: (id enim pariter cum omni animante

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pains must be taken lest any separations of friends arise, but if any such thing happens, that the Friendships may appear rather to have died out than to have been extinguished. But *we* must take care lest Friendships even change themselves into bitter hatreds, from which arise quarrels, libels, insults. These, however, if they shall be endurable, must be put up with; and this consideration must be granted to a long-standing Friendship, that he may be in the wrong who commits, not he who suffers, injustice. On the whole, against all these defects and disadvantages there is one precaution and one safeguard, viz. that men should not begin to love too quickly, nor *should love* the unworthy. But *those* are worthy of Friendship in whom, *in* themselves, there exists a cause why they are loved. A rare class! and, indeed, all things excellent *are* rare, nor is anything more difficult than to find *that* which is altogether perfect in its own class. But most men do not recognise in human affairs anything good, except what is profitable, and they love friends, just as cattle, those most of all from whom they expect that they will obtain the greatest profit. Consequently, they are destitute of that most beautiful and most natural Friendship, worthy to be sought by itself and for itself, and these men are not an example to themselves of what sort and how great this force of Friendship is. For each *man* loves himself, not in order that he himself may get from himself any reward of his own affection, but because each one of himself is dear to himself. And unless this same *feeling* shall be transferred to Friendship, a true friend will never be discovered. For he is indeed, as it were, a second self. But if this is apparent in beasts, *whether they be* flying, *or* swimming, *or* inhabiting the fields, *or* tame *or* wild, that they love themselves first (for that is born alike with every living

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nascitur:) deinde, ut requirant atque appetant, ad quas se applicent ejusdem generis animantes; idque faciunt cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani: quanto id magis in homine fit natura, qui et se ipse diligit, et alterum anquirit, cujus animum ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat pæne unum ex duobus?

XXII.—Sed plerique perverse, ne dicam impudenter, amicum habere talem volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt: quæque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, hæc ab eis desiderant. Par est autem, primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quærere. In talibus ea, quam jamdudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiæ confirmari potest, quum homines benevolentia conjuncti, primum cupiditatibus iis, quibus ceteri serviunt, imperabunt, deinde æquitate justitiaque gaudebunt, omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet, neque quidquam umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit; neque solum colent inter se ac diligent, sed etiam verebuntur. Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiæ tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam. Itaque in iis perniciosus est error, qui existimant libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam. Virtutum amicitia adjutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea, quæ summa sunt, pervenire, conjuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret. Quæ si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturæ bonum optimus beatissimusque comitatus. Hæc est, inquam, societas, in qua omnia insunt, quæ putant homines expetenda,

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creature), then, that they search out and seek living creatures of the same race, to which they may attach themselves; and this they do with longing and with a certain likeness to human affection: how much more does this become nature in man, who both loves himself, and seeks another, whose spirit he may so mingle with his own, that he makes almost one out of two?

XXII.—But most persons perversely, not to say shamelessly, wish to have a friend such as they themselves cannot be; and what they themselves do not give to their friends, these *things* they desire from them. But it is fair that in the first place he himself be a good man, then that he seek another like himself. In such *persons*, that stability of Friendship which we have been some time discussing can be strengthened, when men, united by kind feeling, will first control those passions to which others are slaves, *and* then will rejoice in fairness and justice, and the one will undertake all things for the other, nor will the one ever demand from the other anything except *what is* honourable and just; and not only will they court and love, but they will also respect one another. For he takes away the greatest ornament of Friendship who takes from it respect. Consequently, there is a fatal mistake in those who think that dissoluteness in all passions and vices is permitted in Friendship. Friendship was given by Nature as the handmaid of virtues, not the companion of vices; in order that, since virtue could not arrive by herself at those *things* which are the highest, it might arrive *at them* conjoined and associated with another. And if between any *persons* this alliance either exists, or has existed, or will exist, their companionship must be considered the best and the happiest for the highest good of *our* nature. This is, I say, an alliance in which all things exist, which men consider worth pursuing

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honestas, gloria, tranquillitas animi atque jucunditas: ut et, quum hæc adsint, beata vita sit, et sine his esse non possit. Quod quum optimum maximumque sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera danda est, sine qua neque amicitiam, neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus. Ea vero neglecta, qui se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt, quum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit. Quocirca, (dicendum est enim sæpius,) quum judicaveris, diligere oportet; non, quum dilexeris, judicare. Sed quum multis in rebus negligentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis: præposteris enim utimur consiliis, et acta agimus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio. Nam implicati ultro et citro, vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis, repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione disrumpimus.

XXIII.—Quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime necessariæ tanta incuria. Una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cujus utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt: quamquam a multis ipsa virtus contemnitur et venditatio quædam atque ostentatio esse dicitur. Multi divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat; honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur, quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil esse levius existiment! Itemque cetera, quæ quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt, qui pro nihilo putent. De amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt, et ii, qui ad

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—uprightness, renown, peace and joyousness of mind; so that both, when these are present, life is happy, and without them it cannot be *so*. And since this is the best and greatest *blessing*, if we wish to obtain it, *we* must give attention to virtue, without which we can attain neither Friendship nor anything worth seeking. But when that has been neglected, *those* who think they have friends, then at last perceive that they have made a mistake, when some severe misfortune compels them to try *them*. Wherefore (for *I* must say it frequently), when you have formed an opinion, *you* ought to love; not, when you have loved, form an opinion. But we are punished both in many *other* matters by negligence, and especially in loving and courting friends: for we adopt preposterous plans, and do *things* that have been done, which we are forbidden *to do* by the old proverb. For, being mutually entangled, either by daily intercourse, or even by kind offices, suddenly, in the middle of *our course*, when some unpleasantness has arisen, we break up *our* Friendships.

XXIII.—And for this reason also, such great carelessness, in a matter extremely necessary, is to be the more blamed. For Friendship is the one *thing* in human affairs concerning the advantage of which, all, with one mouth, agree: although by many virtue itself is despised and said to be a sort of boasting and show. Many despise riches, whom, contented with little, simple fare and dress pleases, but honours, with the desire for which some men are inflamed, how many so despise, that they think nothing more worthless, nothing more frivolous! And also other *things*, which seem admirable to some, there are very many who regard as nothing. Concerning Friendship, all, to a man, think the same,—both those, who have

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rempublicam se contulerunt, et ii, qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ii, qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi, postremo ii, qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere. Serpit enim nescio quomodo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam ætatis degendæ rationem patitur esse expertem sui. Quin etiam si quis ea asperitate est et immanitate naturæ, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus: tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitatis suæ. Atque hoc maxime judicaretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret, atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam, hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet. Quis tam esset ferreus, qui eam vitam ferre posset, cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo? Verum ergo illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi, ab aliis senibus auditum: *Si quis in cœlum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore, quæ jucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset.* Sic natura solitarium nihil amat, semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum annititur: quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.

XXIV.—Sed quum tot signis eadem natura declaret,

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devoted themselves to the State, and those who are delighted with the knowledge of things and with learning, and those who leisurely carry on their own business; lastly, those who have given themselves up entirely to pleasures,—that without Friendship life is nothing, at least, if they wish to live in any degree with propriety. For Friendship, somehow or other, creeps through the lives of all, and permits not any mode of spending life to be free from itself. Nay more, if any one is of such harshness and brutality of nature, that he avoids and hates the society of men, such as we have heard that one Timon at Athens was: nevertheless he cannot endure that he should not find some one, to whom he may spit out the poison of his bitterness. And this would especially be determined if something of this kind could happen, that some god should remove us from this populousness of men, and place *us* in solitude somewhere, and there supplying abundance and plenty of all things which nature requires, should completely take away *our* power of beholding a human being. Who would be so iron-hearted that he could endure that life, and that from him solitude would not take away the enjoyment of all pleasures? That therefore is true which, I have heard our old men relate, was accustomed to be said, as I imagine, by Archytas the Tarentine, *and which* has been heard from other old men, that "if any one could have ascended into the heaven and beheld the Nature of the universe and the magnificence of the stars, that admiration would be unpleasant to him, which would have been most agreeable, if he had had some one to whom he might describe *it*." Thus Nature loves nothing solitary, and always strives after something as a support; and this is sweetest in the *case of* the closest friend.

XXIV.—But while *this* same Nature declares by so

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quid velit, anquirat ac desideret: obsurdescimus tamen nescio quomodo, nec ea, quæ ab ea monemur, audimus. Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiæ, multæque causæ suspicionum offensionumque dantur: quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est. Una illa sublevanda offensio est, ut et veritas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici sæpe sunt et objurgandi, et hæc accipienda amice, quum benevole fiunt. Sed, nescio quomodo, verum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit:

Obséquium amicos, véritas odiúm parit.

Molesta veritas, si quidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiæ: sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens præcipitem amicum ferri sinit. Maxima autem culpa in eo est, qui et veritatem aspernatur, et in fraudem obsequio impellitur. Omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est; primum, ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut objurgatio contumelia careat. In *obsequio* autem (quoniam Terentiano verbo lubenter utimur) comitas adsit: assentatio, vitiorum adjutrix, procul amoveatur: quæ non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est: aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur. Cujus autem aures veritati clausæ sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, hujus salus desperanda est. Scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: *Melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri, quam eos*

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many indications what she wishes, requires and desires, we nevertheless somehow or other become deaf *to her voice*, and do not attend to those things which we are warned against by her. For the intercourse of Friendship is varied and manifold, and many causes of suspicion and offence are given, which it is the *duty* of a wise man at one time to avoid, at another to make light of, at another to hear. That one cause of offence must be submitted to, that both truth and trust may be retained in Friendship, for friends must both often be warned and rebuked, and these *warnings and rebukes* must be received in a friendly spirit when they are offered kindly. But, somehow or other, what my intimate friend says in *his* Andria is true:

"Flattery begets friends, truth *begets* hatred."

Truth *is* baneful, if hatred indeed springs from her, which is the poison of Friendship; but flattery *is* much more baneful, because, being indulgent to offences, it suffers a friend to be carried away headlong. But the greatest fault is in him who both despises truth, and is driven by obsequiousness into dishonesty. In all this matter, therefore, care and diligence must be employed, first that warning *may be free from* bitterness, *and* then that reproof may be free from insult. In complaisance however (for I willingly use Terence's expression), let courtesy be present, let cringing, the handmaid of vices, be removed far away; which is not only *not* worthy of a friend, but not even of a free man; for *one* lives in one way with a tyrant, in another with a friend. But *he* whose ears are closed to the truth, so that he refuses to hear what is true from a friend, his safety must be despaired of. For that is a wise *saying* of Cato, as many *others of his are*, "that bitter enemies deserve better from some than those

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amicos, qui dulces videantur: illos verum sæpe dicere, hos numquam. Atque illud absurdum, quod ii, qui monentur, eam molestiam, quam debent capere, non capiunt; eam capiunt, qua debent vacare. Peccasse enim se, non anguntur; objurgari moleste ferunt: quod contra oportebat delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

XXV.—Ut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est veræ amicitiæ, et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter: sic habendum est, nullam in amicitiis pestem esse majorem, quam adulationem, blanditiam, assentationem. Quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium, ad voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem. Quum autem omnium rerum simulatio est vitiosa, (tollit enim judicium veri, idque adulterat,) tum amicitiæ repugnat maxime. Delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiæ valere non potest. Nam quum amicitiæ vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus: qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius, commutabilis, multiplex? Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium, quam animus ejus, qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam vultum atque nutum convertitur?

> ***Négat quis? nego: ait? áio: postremo imperavi egomét mihi,***
> ***Omnia assentári:***

ut ait idem Terentius; sed ille sub Gnathonis persona: quod amici genus adhibere, omnino levitatis est. Multi autem Gnathonum similes quum sint, loco, fortuna,

friends who seem pleasant: that the former often speak the truth, the latter never." And this is absurd, that those who are advised do not feel the annoyance which they ought to feel, *but* feel that which they ought to be free from; for they are not vexed that they have done wrong, *but* are offended at being reproved: whereas *they* ought, on the contrary, to grieve for *their* fault, *and* rejoice at correction.

XXV.—As therefore it is essential to true Friendship both to advise and to be advised, and that the one should act courteously, not harshly, and the other receive *the advice* patiently, not with repugnance: so *we* must hold that there is no greater plague in Friendships than flattery, fawning, *and* adulation. For this vice of weak and deceitful men, who say everything to humour, *but* nothing with regard to truth, must be branded with as many epithets as possible. But while a pretence in everything is bad (for it destroys the perception of the truth, and adulterates it), it is especially antagonistic to Friendship. For it destroys truth, without which the name of Friendship can have no meaning. For since the strength of Friendship is in this, that one soul, as it were, is made out of many, how can this be effected, if not even in each single *individual* will there be a soul one and always the same, but different, changeable, manifold? For what can be so pliable, so wavering, as the soul of him who changes himself, not only in accordance with the feeling and wish, but even *at* the look and nod of another? "Does any one say No? I say No. Does *any one* say Yes? I say Yes. In short, I have commanded myself to agree in everything," as says the same Terence; but he *speaks* in the character of Gnatho, and to admit this kind of friend is altogether *a mark* of folly. But since there are many like the Gnathos, *though* in rank, fortune,

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fama superiores: horum est assentatio molesta, quum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas. Secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest, adhibita diligentia, quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. Concio, quæ ex imperitissimis constat, tamen judicare solet, quid intersit inter popularem, id est assentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem, severum et gravem. Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat in aures concionis, quum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis! Dissuasimus nos. Sed nihil de me: de Scipione dicam libentius. Quanta illi, dii immortales, fuit gravitas! quanta in oratione majestas! ut facile ducem populi Romani non comitem diceres. Sed adfuistis et est in manibus oratio. Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. Atque, ut ad me redeam, meministis, Q. Maximo, fratre Scipionis, et L. Mancino consulibus, quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C. Licinii Crassi videbatur! Cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur. Atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo; tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium nobis defendentibus facile vincebat. Atque id actum est prætore me quinquennio ante quam consul sum factus. Ita re magis, quam auctoritate causa illa defensa est.

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and reputation superior, the flattery of these *persons* is baneful when influence is added to worthlessness. But a fawning friend can be as *easily* discriminated and distinguished from a true *one*, when diligence is employed, just as all things dyed and spurious *can be distinguished* from the unalloyed and real. A popular assembly, which consists of the most inexperienced *persons*, is nevertheless accustomed to determine what difference exists between the popular, that is, the flatterer and worthless citizen, and the consistent, serious, and dignified *one*. With what flatteries did C. Papirius lately insinuate himself into the ears of the popular assembly when he proposed *his* law concerning the re-election of the tribunes of the people! We advised against it. But *I will say* nothing about myself; I will speak more willingly of Scipio. How great, ye immortal gods, was his impressiveness! What majesty *there was* in *his* speech! so that you would easily say that *he was* the leader of the Roman People, not *their* follower. But you were present, and *his* speech is extant. Consequently the popular bill was rejected by the votes of the People. And, to return to myself, you remember, when Q. Maximus, Scipio's brother, and L. Mancinus were consuls, how popular the bill of C. Licinius Crassus concerning the priesthood appeared *to be!* For the right of the colleges to fill up vacancies in their bodies was *by it* transferred to the patronage of the People. And he was the first who began to address the people having his face turned towards the forum; nevertheless, reverence for the immortal gods, with our advocacy, easily defeated his plausible oration; and this happened when I was prætor, five years before I was created consul. Thus, rather by truth than by influence, was that cause supported.

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XXVI.—Quod si in scena, id est in concione, in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si modo id patefactum et illustratum est; quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quæ tota veritate perpenditur? in qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas; ne amare quidem aut amari, quum, id quam vere fiat, ignores. Quamquam ista assentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest, nisi ei, qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur. Ita fit, ut is assentatoribus patefaciat aures suas maxime, qui ipse sibi assentetur et se maxime ipse delectet. Omnino est amans sui virtus: optime enim se ipsa novit, quamque amabilis, sit intelligit: ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor, sed de virtutis opinione. Virtute enim ipsa non tam multi præditi esse, quam videri volunt. Hos delectat assentatio; his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo quum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant. Nulla est igitur hæc amicitia, quum alter verum audire non vult, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. Nec parasitorum in comœdiis assentatio nobis faceta videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi.

Magnás vero agere grátias Thaïs mihi?

Satis erat respondere, *magnas;—ingentes*, inquit. Semper auget assentator id, quod is, cujus ad voluntatem dicitur, vult esse magnum. Quamobrem, quamvis blanda ista vanitas apud eos valeat, qui ipsi illam allectant et invitant; tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animum advertant, ne

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XXVI.—But if on the *public* stage *of life*, that is, in the assembly, in which there is plenty of room for pretended and imaginary circumstances, truth nevertheless prevails, if only it has been explained and made clear, what ought to be the case in Friendship, which is entirely measured by *its* sincerity? in which unless, as is said, you see the unveiled heart *of your friend* and show your own, you have nothing reliable, nothing tested, not even the loving or being loved, since you are ignorant how truly it is done. And yet that acquiescence, however injurious it may be, can nevertheless injure no one except him who accepts and is pleased with it. Thus it happens that that *man* opens his ears most to flatterers who flatters himself and is most charmed with himself. Virtue is, to be sure, a lover of herself, for she knows herself best, and understands how loveable she is. However, I am not now speaking of virtue, but of an affectation of virtue. For so many men do not wish to be endued with virtue itself as *wish* to seem *to be so*. These flattery pleases. When to these language framed to suit their desires is employed, they consider that insincere statement to be a testimony to their own deserts. This, therefore, is no Friendship, when the one will not listen to the truth, *and* the other is ready to speak falsely. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies appear amusing unless they were bombastic soldiers. "Does Thais then return me great thanks?" It was enough to reply "Great *thanks*"; "Huge *thanks*," says she. The flatterer always magnifies that, which he, for whose gratification it is spoken, wishes to be great. Wherefore, although that flattering untruth may have weight with those who themselves encourage and invite *it*; nevertheless, even the more serious and strong-minded must be warned that they take care

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callida assentatione capiantur. Aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors: callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet, studiose cavendum est. Nec enim facillime agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam adversando, sæpe assentetur, et litigare se simulans blandiatur, atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is, qui illusus sit, plus vidisse videatur. Quid autem turpius quam illudi? Quod ne accidat, cavendum est, ut in Epiclero:

> Hodié me ante omnes cómicos stultós senes
> Versáris atque emúnxeris lautíssime.

Hæc enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est improvidorum et credulorum senum. Sed nescio quo pacto ab amicitiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium, (de hac dico sapientia, quæ videtur in hominem cadere posse,) ad leves amicitias deflexit oratio. Quamobrem ad illa prima redeamus, eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.

XXVII.—Virtus, virtus, inquam, C. Fanni et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat. In ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia: quæ quum se extulit et ostendit lumen suum, et idem aspexit agnovitque in alio: ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est: ex quo eorum exardescit sive amor sive amicitia. Utrumque enim dictum est ab amando. Amare autem nihil aliud est, nisi eum ipsum diligere, quem ames, nulla indigentia nulla utilitate quæsita: quæ tamen ipsa efflorescit ex

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lest they be taken *in* with cunning flattery. For *one* who flatters openly *there is* no one *who* does not detect, unless he who is very stupid; *it is* lest the crafty and disguised insinuate himself *that we* must studiously be on our guard. For he is not very easily recognised, since even by opposition he often flatters, and fawns while pretending that he is quarrelling, and at last gives up his hands and suffers himself to be beaten, so that he who has been cheated may seem to have seen farther *than himself*. But what is more disgraceful than to be befooled? And lest this happen *we* must be on our guard, as in Epiclerus, "You will have twisted me about to-day above all the foolish old men in comedy, and cheated me most completely." For this, even in plays, is the most foolish character, *that* of short-sighted and credulous old men. But, I don't know by what means, from the friendships of perfect men, that is of the wise (I am speaking of this wisdom which seems able to fall to a man), *my* conversation has descended to unimportant friendships. Therefore, let us return to those first *mentioned points*, and bring those very *points* at length to a conclusion.

XXVII.—Virtue, Virtue, I say, C. Fannius, and you, Q. Mucius, both produces and preserves Friendships. For in her consists the harmony with circumstances, in her, stability, in her, constancy; and when she has revealed herself, and shown her splendour, and beheld and recognised the same in another, she brings herself to that, and in turn receives that which is in the other, from which blazes forth whether *we call it* their love or friendship. For each has been *so* named from *the act of* loving. But to love is nothing else than to have an affection for that very *person* whom you love, though no want, though no advantage is sought, which, however, itself blossoms out of

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amicitia, etiam si tu eam minus secutus sis. Hac nos adolescentes benevolentia senes illos, L. Paullum, M. Catonem, C. Gallum, P. Nasicam, Ti. Gracchum, Scipionis nostri socerum, dileximus. Hæc etiam magis elucet inter æquales, ut inter me et Scipionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummium. Vicissim autem senes in adolescentium caritate acquiescimus, ut in vestra, ut in Q. Tuberonis; equidem etiam admodum adolescentis, P. Rutilii, A. Virginii, familiaritate delector. Quoniamque ita ratio comparata est vitæ naturæque nostræ, ut alia ætas oriatur ex alia; maxime quidem optandum est ut, cum æqualibus possis, quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus sis, cum eisdem ad calcem, ut dicitur, pervenire. Sed quoniam res humanæ fragiles caducæque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi sunt, quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur. Caritate enim benevolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata jucunditas. Mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque vivet: virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quæ exstincta non est. Nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, qui illam semper in manibus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis. Nemo umquam animo aut spe majora suscipiet, qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet. Equidem ex omnibus rebus, quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo, quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare. In hac mihi de republica consensus, in hac rerum privatarum consilium, in eadem

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Friendship, even if you have little sought it. With this kindliness we, when young, loved those aged men L. Paullus, M. Cato, C. Gallus, P. Nasica, Ti. Gracchus, the father-in-law of our Scipio. This *affection* shines out even more among equals *in age*, as between me and Scipio, L. Furius, P. Rupilius, Sp. Mummius, But in turn, when old, we repose in the affection of young men, as in yours, as in *that* of Q. Tubero. I indeed am also gladdened with the acquaintance of the very youthful P. Rutilius *and* A. Virginius. And since the constitution of our life and nature has been so settled that one generation springs from another, it is indeed greatly to be wished that you may be able, with your equals *in age*, with whom, as it were, you started from the barrier, as it is said, with the same to arrive at the goal. But since human possessions are frail and fleeting, some *persons* must always be sought, whom we may love and by whom we may be loved. For when affection and kind feeling have been taken away, all pleasure has been taken away from life. For me indeed, Scipio, albeit he has been suddenly snatched away, nevertheless lives, and always will live; for I loved the virtue of that man, and it has not been extinguished. And it is not exhibited before my eyes alone, who have had it always before me, but it will also be illustrious and distinguished among posterity. No one will ever undertake things greater than ordinary, either in imagination or hope, who does not think that he should set before himself the memory and example of that *great man.* I indeed, of all the advantages which either fortune or Nature has bestowed on me, have nothing which I can compare with the Friendship of Scipio. In this *Friendship* there was an agreement with me in politics, in it advice in *my* private affairs; in the same *Friendship*

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requies plena oblectationis fuit. Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem senserim: nihil audivi ex ipso, quod nollem. Una domus erat, idem victus, isque communis: neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes. Nam quid ego de studiis dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi, in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus? Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset desiderium conjunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem. Sed nec illa exstincta sunt, aluntur potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria: et, si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen afferret mihi ætas ipsa solatium; diutius enim in hoc desiderio esse non possum. Omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiam si magna sunt. Hæc habui, de amicitia quæ dicerem. Vos autem hortor, ut ita virtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut, ea excepta, nihil amicitia præstabilius putetis.

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there was repose full of enjoyment. I never offended him in even the least thing, so far, indeed, as I have been aware. I heard from himself nothing which I should be unwilling *to hear*. *We* had one home, one table, and that in common; and not only our military service, but also our travels and country walks *were* taken in company. For what shall I say of *our* occupations in always investigating and learning something, in which, removed from the eyes of the people, we spent all our leisure time? And if the recollection and memory of these things had died together with him, I should have been able by no means to endure the loss of *that* most intimate *friend* and affectionate man. But neither are they extinct; they arer ather cherished and increased by reflection and memory; and, if I had been quite deprived of them, *old* age itself would nevertheless bring me great consolation; for I cannot live long in such bereavement. But all things of short duration ought to be bearable, even though they be great. This is what I had to say about Friendship. But I exhort you so to regard Virtue, without which Friendship cannot exist, that, with the exception of Virtue, you may think nothing preferable to Friendship.

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GRAMMATICAL NOTES.

Cap. I.—Introductory.—The "De Amicitia" is rather a treatise than a dialogue, and is dedicated by Cicero to his friend Titus Pomponius Atticus.

Quum sæpe multa, etc. This is an anacoluthon—an example of inconsecutiveness. Cic. begins as if, instead of *in sermonem incidere,* he were going to use a verb governing the accus., *e.g. narravit, dixit,* which must therefore be supplied. The following construction is in oratio obliqua, and the order of the principal sentence is *memini illum sedentem domi in hemicyclio incidere in eum sermonem qui,* etc. *Essem* is suboblique in the orat. obl., and is therefore subjunct. *Solebat* is not under the government of *memini,* and therefore not in the orat. obl.

Hemicyclio; may mean his class of pupils.

Utebare multum; "you made much use of," *i.e.* "were very familiar with." *Capitali odio;* "by a mortal hatred." *Capitalis,* relating to the *caput*, the head, chief part of the body; hence, mortal.

M. F.; *i.e.* Marci Filius, son of Marcus.

Induxi; *induco* means to lead a character on to the stage—to introduce; here used metaphorically.

Inquam et inquit; "says I and says he." These words are here used as substantives, or as a phrase, in the nominative case to *interponeretur.*

Mecum ageres; "you pleaded with me," *i.e.* "tried to persuade me."

Persona; character or part which one sustains in the world; not his *corpus* or bodily person, a meaning which *persona* never has in classical Latin.

Nescio quo pacto; "I do not know by what means," "I do not know how." "Somehow or other."

Velim avertas; "I wish you would," *i.e.* "be so good as to turn aside your attention." *Volo* usu. takes inf., but the subjunct. expresses the desire in a more polite way than either the infinitive or imperative.

Cap. II.—Fannius and Scævola, sons-in-law of Lælius, enquire how he bore the death of his friend Scipio Africanus the Younger.

M. Catoni tribuebatur; the title of *Sapiens* was bestowed on M. Porcius Cato the Censor, *q.v.*

Prudens; skilled in the practice of a thing: *sciens,* simply knowing it.

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Qui Septem appellantur; "who are called The Seven." It is not settled who were "the Seven Wise Men of Greece," but Solon was one of them. *Qui ista subtilius quœrunt;* "those who examine into such matters more closely." *Ista*="those things you mention." The Stoics (*q.v.*) are referred to, who affected to despise the old philosophers.

Athenis unum; Apollo had a famous oracle at Delphi, which pronounced Socrates to be the wisest man.

Ut ducas; *duco*=suppose, think, consider; *ut* is here consequential=so that.

Virtute; ablative of comparison after *inferiores*.

Nonis; the abl. of time when; the Nones were the fifth day of the month, except that,—

> "In March, July, October, May
> The Nones are on the *seventh* day."

They were so called because they were on the ninth (*nonus*) day before the Ides.

In nostro collegio; "in our College of Augurs." The College of Augurs consisted of fifteen co-optative members, who met on the Nones of every month to consult the auspices by which public business was regulated. The College of Augurs was founded by either Romulus or Numa, it is doubtful which.

Usurpavi; *usurpo* (connected with *utor*, *usus*, and perhaps *rapere*), means to take into frequent use; hence, to perform a duty. It is only in late Latin that the word means to usurp.

Nec agnosco, nec postulo; "I neither acknowledge nor ask for." He alludes to the compliments paid him by Fannius. He neither asks for them nor acknowledges them to be deserved.

Paullum et Gallum; *i.e.* Lucius Æmilius Paullus, who fell at Cannæ, and his friend, Caius Sulpicius Gallus, both of whom bore the loss of their young sons with great fortitude.

In pueris; in their childhood.

In perfecto et spectato viro; in the case of a mature and eminent man. *Spectatus*=looked upon by the public as even then eminent and destined to greater honour. The son of Cato the Censor had been elected prætor before his death.

Cave anteponas ne istum quidem; "take care that you prefer to Cato not even that man." *Cave*, followed by subjunct. without *ne*, as here, is a mild and polite form of the imperative. *Istum*, that man you mention; *i.e.* Socrates.

Sic habetote; so think; *i.e.* "form your opinion thus." *Sic* usu. refers, as here, to something that goes before.

CAP. III.—Lælius admits that he grieved at the loss of Scipio, but on his own account, not on that of his friend, because he felt that no harm had happened to him.

Scipionis desiderio; by my regret for Scipio. *Scipionis* is

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here the objective genitive; *i.e.* it represents the object of the regret. *Desiderium* is the grief or regret caused by the absence of something that is lost.

Non egeo medicina; I do not want medicine; *i.e.* a remedy. *Egeo* means to want in the sense of needing; *careo* means to want merely in the sense of being without a thing.

Actum esse; lit. that it was done; *i.e.* "his life was spent."

Continuo adolescens; "from his youth up."

Ante tempus; the legal age at which a man could be made consul was forty-two, but Scipio Africanus the Younger was elected consul the first time when he was only thirty-seven.

Iterum suo tempore; "on the second occasion at his proper age."

Reipublicæ pæne sero; "almost (too) late for the state": because the war with the Numantines was still going on in Spain, and Scipio had to be summoned from an embassy to Egypt and Asia to take the command.

Duabus urbibus eversis; abl. abs. The two cities were Carthage and Numantia. At the close of the Third Punic War the Senate decreed, "Carthago delenda est," which was done B.C. 146. Numantia was taken by Scipio Africanus the Younger thirteen years afterwards, and he was in consequence called Numantīnus.

Mærore funeris; by the grief shown on the occasion of his death; *funeris* is the objective genitive. Scipio Africanus the Younger died suddenly at the age of fifty-six, and was supposed to have been murdered by some of his political opponents, on account of his attempt to subvert the agrarian law of Ti. Gracchus.

A patribus conscriptis; by the Senate. The proper title was "*patres et conscripti.*" The *patres* were the original 100 senators, afterwards increased to 300 by the first Tarquin. Those enrolled after the expulsion of the Tarquins, to fill up vacancies caused by death, etc., were called *conscripti;* but the title *patres et conscripti* was retained even when all the original *patres* were dead.

Mecum et cum Scipione disserere; *i.e.* in the "De Senectute" of Cicero, a so-called dialogue between Cato the Censor, Lælius, and Scipio Africanus the Younger.

Etiamnum erat Scipio; *i.e.* he was in full bodily vigour at the time of his death.

CAP. IV.—Lælius shows that there is no reason for grief at the loss of Scipio, since, whether the soul is immortal or not, he is equally well off.

Iis qui nuper disserere; those who taught the Epicurean doctrine that enjoyment in this life should be the highest aim of man.

Jura religiosa; religious observances due to the dead, such as burial, etc., to which the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Egyptians attached great importance.

Qui in hac terra; *i.e.* Pythagoras and his followers.

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Vel ejus, qui Apollinis, etc.; *i.e.* Socrates, one of whose favourite doctrines was that of the immortality of the soul.

Ut in plerisque; change took place in most of the doctrines of Socrates, but he never wavered in that of the immortality of the soul.

Optimoque et justissimo cuique; "to each best and most just man"; *i.e.* "to all the best and most just."

Qui quidem; *quidem* often has the force of "as you well know," and perhaps would be better so translated here.

In quiete per visum ex Africano; in a vision, during sleep, from Scipio Africanus Major, who had been dead about fifty years, and who therefore knew experimentally the condition of the soul after death.

Optimi cujusque animus; Lat. "the soul of each best man"; Eng. "the souls of all the best men."

Quocum et domus et militia communis (sunt); "with whom both home and military service were common"; *i.e.* with whom they were shared. *Militia* refers to the close of the Third Punic War, when Lælius accompanied Scipio to Africa.

Ista . . . fama; "that reputation you speak of."

Est cordi; "is in my heart"; *i.e.* "is dear to me."

Vix tria aut quatuor . . . paria amicorum; the friendships famed among the ancients were those between Theseus and Pirithous, Achilles and Patroclus, Pylades and Orestes, and Damon and Pythias.

Cap. V.—Lælius says that friendships should be based on the virtue of those with whom they are contracted, and that it is natural to man to contract them.

Ista consuetudo; *i.e.* "the custom you mention of proposing a subject for discussion." The force of *iste* (that of you), should always be noted.

Qui ista profitentur; the Sophists in Greece taught morals, rhetoric, etc., as a profession, for regular pay, and sometimes made large fortunes thereby.

Ad vivum reseco; "to cut back to the quick," refers to the cutting of the nails, and so expresses the pushing an argument too far. He does not deny that Friendship may sometimes exist between such as have not attained to a high decree of goodness.

Ut illi; *i.e.* the Stoics, who fixed an unattainable standard of excellence for men.

Subtilius; "too minutely"; this is often the force of the comparative.

Sibi habeant sapientiæ nomen; "let them keep to themselves alone a definition of wisdom."

Pingui Minerva; abl. of accompanying circumstance; "with plain mother-wit," *i.e.* "with common sense" (*cf.* Minerva).

Ita adducta in angustum; *adducere in angustum* (*locum*), to draw into a narrow place, *i.e.* to confine, limit.

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Cap. VI.—Lælius argues that after wisdom Friendship is the next greatest good to man.

Haud scio an; always affirmative in Cicero, not, "I am not sure whether," but, "I rather think," "I am inclined to think"; rather stronger than "perhaps."

Valetudinem; condition of health whether good or bad; here qualified by *bonam*.

Honores; usu. means public offices, the holding of which was considered very honourable.

Sermonisque nostri; "of our mode of speech"; *i.e.* the meaning we commonly attach to the word.

Ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia; the Stoics are here referred to.

Paullos, Catos, Gallos, Scipiones, Philos; "such men as Paullus, Cato, Gallus," etc.

Quicum omnia audeas; *qui* here is the old form of the ablat. =*quo*.

Ut laudere; *laudēre=lauderis*. 2 s. pres. subj. pass.

Non aqua, non igni; *i.e.* the greatest necessities of life. At Rome, when a man was outlawed, every one was forbidden to supply him with either fire or water, which made the sentence amount to entire banishment.

Ut aiunt; "as they say," *i.e.* "according to the proverb."

Qui pauci nominantur; "who few are mentioned; *i.e.* "a few of whom," referring to the famous pairs of friends already alluded to.

Cap. VII.—That Friendship produces concord, and avoids dissension.

Tamquam exemplar; Aristotle thought that a good man saw in his friend a sort of reflection of his own virtue.

Egentes abundant; "the needy enjoy plenty."

Imbecilli; weak of body.

Tantus honos memoria . . . prosequitur. After a composite subject, as here, the verb is sing. if the united subjects form an evidently singular notion; and also when the predicate is constructed with only one of the subjects, and mentally supplied with the other. The former is called *Syllepsis*, the latter *Zeugma*.

Agrigentinum quidem; Empedocles is here alluded to, who held that Friendship was the associating principle of all things in nature, and discord the dissociating principle.

Vaticinatum; *vaticino*, fr. *vates*, a prophet, and *cano*, to sing, means to sing as a prophet, but is used of poets as well.

Nova fabula; the play was entitled the "Dulorestes," and was an imitation of the "Iphigenia in Tauris" of Euripides.

Si videbitur; "if it shall seem good to you," *i.e.* "if you please."

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CAP. VIII.—The origin of Friendship is not the advantages which it brings to either side, but a natural feeling of affection.

Quid refert? "what does it matter?" *rĕfert=remfert,* lit. it carries or bears upon one's affairs or property; hence, it concerns, is of importance or of consequence to. *Tuâ refert, meâ refert;* it concerns you, me, etc.=*tuam rem fert, meam rem fert,* etc. *Rĕfert* is from *rĕfero.*

Quum difficile est, tum; *quum . . . tum,* as here, often mean both . . . and.

Percipiuntur; "are acquired." In "De Senectute" *percipere* is used of gathering in the harvest.

Simulatione amicitiæ; the pretence of Friendship which does not exist; *dissimulatio* is the dissembling or disguising what really does exist. The same distinction exists between *simulo* and *dissimulo.*

Temporis causa; "for the sake of advantage"; *tempus* often stands for the condition in which one is placed, and carries with it the idea of trouble or disadvantage; thence it comes to mean the advantage of assistance given to any one in trouble.

Quippe quum; "since, in fact," "inasmuch as."

Non oderit; Tarquinius Superbus, last king of Rome, was expelled for his cruelty; Spurius Cassius was put to death by the patricians on a charge of aiming at kingly power; Spurius Mælius was put to death on the same charge. *Oderit* is pres. subjunct. in signification, the verb *odi* having no present forms. "In interrogations, every relative pronoun or particle is conjunctional, introducing a subordinate sentence."—KENNEDY, "P. S. Latin Gram.," § 73.

Propter crudelitatem; the Romans charged Hannibal with cruelty, but he was not worse than themselves. Great magnanimity as well as great cruelty were displayed at different times by both sides.

CAP. IX.—That the tendency to Friendship is increased by intimacy and a mutual appreciation of goodness.

Quam si qui putant; the relative pronoun at the commencement of a clause may often be elegantly translated by a conjunction and a demonstrative, as here, "and if any think that this arises from helplessness."

Quod si ita esset; "and if this were so," *viz.* that Friendship sprang from want and indigence.

Suaque omnia in se ipso posita; there is a similar expression in Cap. II., where Fannius, addressing Lælius, says, "*Hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant, ut omnia tua in te posita ducas.*" It implies the honourable and proper confidence which a virtuous man should have in himself, with an independence of outward circumstances.

Neque enim beneficium feneramur; lit. "for we do not put our kindness out to interest"; *i.e.* we do not do good for the purpose of getting greater good in return.

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At ii qui pecudum ritu, etc.; referring to the Epicureans again.

CAP. X.—The causes which lead to the dissolution of Friendships. This chapter contains Lælius's account of the sentiments of Africanus the Younger, and is in oratio obliqua governed by *dicebat*.

De republica non idem sentiretur; *i.e.* political views differ.

Ingravescente; inceptive; "beginning to become burdensome."

Prætexta; *i.e. toga prætexta*, the bordered toga, the outer garment bordered with purple, which was worn by the higher magistrates, and by free-born children till they assumed the *toga virilis*, the man's gown.

In honoris contentionem; "rivalry for public office," which was always considered honourable employment.

CAP. XI.—We are not justified in doing wrong for the sake of a friend.

Si Coriolanus habuit amicos; does not imply that he had no friends. The indicative expresses a fact. A similar use of "if" is common in English.

Quod tanti Gracchum fecisset; *tanti* is here the genitive of price or value.

Quæstione nova; the inquisition or questioning of an accused person or a witness under torture. It had been illegal to deal thus with a Roman citizen before the inquiry which followed the death of Tib. Gracchus.

In Asiam profugit; *i.e.* into Asia Minor.

Perfectâ quidem sapientiâ simus; ablative of quality, corresponding to the genitive of quality; *e.g. vir perfectæ sapientiæ.*

In censura; "in the censorship." The censors superintended the census for purposes of taxation, and had control in all matters relating to public morality.

Quid attinet dicere; *attinet* is impers. here; "what does it matter to say?" "Why need I say?"

Caius frater; *i.e.* Caius Gracchus, brother of Tib. Gracchus.

Nunc idem acerrimus; there is an anachronism here, as Lælius is supposed to be speaking B.C. 129; but Tiberius Gracchus had been assassinated three years before. Caius indeed took up his brother's views.

Acerrimus is here an adverbial attribute, in agreement with the noun, but in close connection with the verb.

CAP. XII.—The chief rule in Friendship.

Sanciatur; "let it be made sacred or inviolable."

Quid in P. Scipione effecerint; *i.e.* "in the case of Publius Scipio Nasica," *q.v.* He was so unpopular after the murder of Tib. Gracchus, that the Senate sent him on a pretended mission to Asia, to get him out of the way of the people, although he was Pontifex Max. He died an exile and a wanderer.

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De C. autem Gracchi tribunatu; Caius Gracchus did not become tribune till some years after Lælius is represented as speaking.

Serpit deinde res; *res*, which may stand for almost anything, here means a public movement.

Tabella; diminutive of *tabula*; a little tablet by means of which the Roman citizens recorded their votes. At various times, within eight years, at the period referred to by Lælius, three laws were passed regulating the mode of voting. These were called *Leges Tabellariæ*, and were 1. *Lex Gabinia*, 2. *Lex Cassia*, 3. *Lex Papiria*, *q.v.*

His resistatur; "than how they can be resisted," lit. "than how it may be resisted to them." Those verbs, *e.g. resistere, invidere, parcere*, etc., which are folld. by the dat. in the act. voice, can only be used impersonally in the passive.

Haud scio an; always affirmative in Cicero = "I rather think."

Non minori causæ; *dativus propositi*, or dative of purpose.

Cap. XIII.—What the law of Friendship should be; how we should treat our friends, and be treated by them in return.

Honesta; what we can honourably desire of them, and nothing beyond.

Ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogamur; *i.e.* do promptly the *honesta* which we are asked to do.

Auctoritas; sometimes authority, but here "influence."

Adhibitæ pareatur; *pareatur* is impersonal, because in the active voice *pareo* takes the dative.

Nam quibusdam, quos audio, etc.; the order is, *Nam opinor quædam mirabilia placuisse quibusdam quos audio habitos (esse) sapientes in Græcia.*

Quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiæ; *laxissimas* is here an adverbial attribute; "to hold the reins of friendship as loosely as possible."

Securitatem; freedom from care and anxiety; not security in its modern sense, which means freedom from danger.

Ut quisque minimum firmitatis habeat; "in proportion as each has."

O præclaram sapientiam; the exclamatory accusative: common in Cicero.

Consentaneum; what all will approve of, hence becoming, fit, proper; fr. *consentio*, to agree in thought.

Humanitatem; human feeling; the feeling proper to a man.

Quum multis in rebus, tum in amicitia; "both in many other matters as well as in friendship."

Diffundatur . . . contrahatur; the subject is *quæ* (*virtus*) from *virtutem* above.

Cap. XIV.—That the anxieties which we sometimes feel on account of our friends are no more an argument against Friendship, than the difficulties which the virtuous man has sometimes to encounter are an argument against virtue.

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Contrahat; the subject is *significatio virtutis.*

Immunis (*in*, neg.; *munus*, office, duty); free from office, duty, obligation. *Tantum abest ut;* it is so far from being the case that.

Atque haud scio an, etc.; literally, "and I rather think that it is not even necessary that nothing should ever be wanting to our friends at all"; but this does not make very good English.

Viguissent; conjunctive; it is the same in form as the subjunctive, but is not governed by any other word, as the latter always is.

CAP. XV.—That the very rich have fewest real friends.

Exsulantem; *i.e.* after his expulsion from Rome.

Illa superbia et importunitate; ablat. of quality, "a man of that arrogance," etc. Tarquinius Superbus is alluded to.

Insipiente fortunato; ablat. of comparison after *intolerabilius.*

Commodis moribus; ablat. of quality.

Ut ita dicam; "so to say," "to use a metaphor."

Istorum; as though mentioned by an opponent in argument.

CAP. XVI. Lælius discusses various theories, as to the limitation of the exercise of Friendship; but, dismissing them all, maintains that the best way of guarding against the evils arising from unsound friendships is to be extremely careful with whom we contract friendships.

Quanti quisque . . . tanti; genitives of price or value.

Acerbius; "too bitterly," "over-vehemently."

Honeste . . . honestissime; these words must not be taken in their strictest sense, since no Friendship justifies really dishonourable conduct.

Ad calculos vocare amicitiam; "to call Friendship to too close a reckoning." *Calculus* was a pebble used for reckoning; *ad calculos vocare*, "to call a man to account."

Si prius . . . edixero; "if first I shall have said," *i.e.* "as soon as I have said."

Omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis; "trying to reduce all things under his own power"; this is frequently the meaning of the present participle.

Recte factis; "things done rightly"; *i.e.* "good deeds."

CAP. XVII.—On the limitations in Friendship, and the want of care usually shown in choosing friends.

Est enim quatenus; "there is a point, as far as which."

Virtus quam sequitur caritas; *virtus* here means, not virtue generally, but those qualities of mind and body which gain esteem.

Neglecta amicitia; ablative absolute; "Friendship being neglected"; *i.e.* "to the disregard of Friendship."

In honoribus; "in honourable public offices."

CAP. XVIII.—Lælius expands his statement, that Friendship cannot exist except between the good, and that friends should be unreserved, affable, and courteous to one another.

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Utraque in re; "in either circumstance"; *i.e.* in his own prosperity and in his friend's adversity.

Ut . . . delectetur; lit. "that he be pleased," or, "that one be pleased"; *i.e.* "that he may be pleased with, or take pleasure in."

Accedat; subjunct. after *oportet*, which usually takes infinitive.

CAP. XIX.—That Friendships should be durable, and that the superior of two friends should put himself on a level with the inferior.

Subdifficilis; "somewhat difficult." This is the common meaning of *sub*, when prefixed to an adjective.

Qualis erat Scipionis; Scipio Africanus Minor.

Maximum fratrem; Scipio's own brother, Quintus Fabius Maximus Æmilianus, *q.v.*

Quum in proximum quemque confertur; "when it is conferred on each nearest"; *i.e.* "on all those nearest to us."

CAP. XX.—Lælius states certain good reasons for the dissolution of Friendships.

(Alios) officia exprobrantium; *alios* must be understood here; the partic. is followed by two accusatives, a direct acc., *alios*, and an acc. of respect, *officia*.

Non fere contingit; "almost does not happen," *i.e.* "scarcely ever happens."

Sustinere; *i.e. sustinere* (*possit*), from *possis* above.

Quamvis licet excellas; "although it is permitted that you excel," *i.e.* "although you may be in a high position."

Omnino; "on the whole," "altogether," "in the highest sense," "absolutely."

Pædagogi; (Gr.) slaves who took their master's children to school, and had the care of them at home.

Alio quodam modo; supply *tractandi sunt.*

Desiderium; "loss," "regret," "sense of pain at absence"; hence "separation."

CAP. XXI.—That when it is desirable that Friendships should be severed, it should be done gradually, not violently, and certainly not so as to produce enmity. But great care should be taken in forming Friendships.

Meo nomine; "in my name," *i.e.* "on my account."

Dissuendæ magis quam discindendæ; "to be unsewn rather than torn asunder."

Graviter; "after due consideration," opposed to *leviter*, which means "without due thought and care."

Auctoritate; "with dignity."

Alter idem; like *alter ego*, "a second self."

CAP. XXII.—That the right foundation of Friendship is virtue; and that we should carefully judge a man's character before forming a Friendship with him.

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Similem sui; *similis* with the genitive, as here, usually denotes internal likeness; with the dative, merely external likeness.

CAP. XXIII.—That the desire of Friendship is natural and common to all.

Omnes ad unum; "all, to a man."

Idem sentiunt; "are of the same opinion."

Totos; adverbial attribute, "entirely."

Liberaliter; "in a manner becoming a *liber* or freeman."

Si quis ea asperitate est et immanitate naturæ; ablatives of quality or character.

Timonem nescio quem; lit. "Timon, whom I do not know"; an expression used in speaking somewhat disparagingly of a person: "one Timon at Athens."

Apud quem; "in whose society"; Timon's only acquaintance was Alcibiades."

CAP. XXIV.—Some of the amenities of Friendship.

Nescio quomodo; "I don't know how," *i.e.* "somehow or other."

Sapientis est; genit. of part or duty.

Obsequium amicos, etc. The verse is from the "Andria" of Terence, act i. sc. 1, line 41.

Præcipitem; adverbial attribute.

Ne libero quidem; the word or words affected always come between *ne* and *quidem*.

Vivitur; impersonal, lit. "it is lived" = "we live."

Objurgari moleste ferunt; "they bear to be reproved with an ill grace," *i.e.* "they are offended at being reproved."

CAP. XXV.—Against flattery in Friendship.

Quamvis enim multis nominibus; "with as many names as you please"; *quamvis* is from *quam* and *volo*.

Nomen amicitiæ valere non potest; "The name of Friendship cannot be strong," or have weight, or meaning.

Convertitur; here used in a middle sense; "changes himself."

Ut ait idem Terentius; "Eunuchus," act ii. sc. 2, line 21.

Gnathonum similes; "like the Gnathos"; genit. of internal likeness; *Gnatho* is the parasite of the play.

Quid intersit; "what difference there is," subjunct., subordinate to *judicare*.

Est in manibus oratio; lit. "is in our hands," "is extant."

In forum versus; "turned towards the Forum," where the plebs assembled.

Nobis dependentibus; the proposed law was rejected through the opposition of Lælius; ablative absolute.

CAP. XXVI.—Against flattery, and in favour of sincerity in Friendship.

Tota veritate perpenditur; *tota* is here an adverbial attribute: "which is entirely measured by its sincerity."

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Nihil exploratum habeas; "you have nothing which has been tested." "The participle perfect passive is used to express a past action continuing in its consequences, after such verbs as *habeo, teneo, possideo*," etc.—KENNEDY: "P. S. Latin Gram."

Virtutis opinione; "conceit of virtue."

Testimonium esse laudum suarum; objective genit., which must often be translated by some other word than *of*: "a testimony to their own deserts."

Vero agere gratias; the historic infinitive, used by Latin historians instead of the indicative. The verse is in Terence's "Eunuchus," act iii. sc. 1, line 1.

Ista vanitas; *ista* is used as though the speaker were arguing with an opponent.

Det manus; "surrenders," "gives up."

Emunxeris; "you will have cheated"; *emungo*, lit. to wipe the nose, is thus used in comedy, in allusion to one who is so feeble in intellect as to require some one to perform that office for him.

CAP. XXVII.—Lælius enlarges on his Friendship with his departed friend Scipio; and concludes by exhorting his hearers to regard Friendship as second only to virtue.

Convenientia rerum; lit. "the coming together of things," *i.e.* "harmony," "agreement."

Sive amor sive amicitia; "whichever you please to call it, whether love or friendship."

Quæ tamen ipsa; *i.e. utilitas.*

Nos adolescentes, etc.; plural used for singular, as often.

Ad calcem; the goal or limit in a race-course, marked with *calx*, *i.e.* lime or chalk.

Recordatio is the recalling to mind what one has temporarily forgotten; *memoria*, the retaining in mind without forgetting.

Diutius; the comparative is sometimes used absolutely, as here, implying merely an excess of the positive quality.

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INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.

Æmiliānus, -i; Scipio Africanus the Younger (adopted by the elder son of Scipio Africanus the Elder) was called Æmilianus from his real father, Lucius Æmilius Paullus.

Æmilius, -i; Quintus Æmilius Papus; consul B.C. 282, when he defeated the Boii. He also aided Fabricius against Pyrrhus, king of Epīrus, and was censor in 275.

Africanus, -i; a cognomen of the elder and the younger Scipio, on account of their successes against the Carthaginians in the second and third Punic wars.

Agrigentum, -i; a city in Sicily.

Agrigentīnus, -a, -um; adj. of Agrigentum. Empĕdŏclēs Agrigentinus held that Friendship was the associating principle of all things in nature, and Discord the dissociating principle.

Andria, -æ; *The Maid of Andros* (one of the Cyclades), the title of the first play exhibited by Terence, B.C. 166.

Annibal, -ălis; see Hannibal.

Apollo, -ĭnis; one of the great divinities of the Greeks; son of Zeus (Jupiter) and Leto (Latona), and twin-brother of Artemis (Diana); born in Delos; the god of help, punishment, prophecy (having a celebrated oracle at Delphi), song, and the sun; and protector of flocks and herds.

Archȳtas, -æ; Tarentinus, *i.e.* of Tarentum; a Pythagorean philosopher, mathematician, statesman, and general; lived about B.C. 400; contemporary with Plato.

Asia, -æ: formerly only what is now called Asia Minor; afterwards extended; the north and east parts of the continent however being almost entirely unknown to the ancients.

Athēnæ, -ārum; Athens; capital of Attica, in Greece; about four miles from the sea, between the small rivers Cephissus and Ilissus: one of the most famous cities of antiquity.

Atticus, -i; Titus Pomponius; a friend of Cicero, to whom he addresses both the "De Amicitia" and the "De Senectute." He had resided long in Athens, whence his name Atticus: died B.C. 32, of voluntary starvation.

Attilius, -i; Lucius, an eminent Roman lawyer, who lived about B.C. 200.

Bias, -antos: one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece; flourished about B.C. 550.

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sons of the above: both tribunes of the plebs, and lost their lives in attempting to improve the condition of their poorer fellow citizens. Tib. was publicly assassinated in an insurrection led by P. Scipio Nasica, B.C. 122. Caius caused himself to be killed by his own slaves to escape the vengeance of his foes, B.C. 121.

Græcia Magna; a name given to Southern Italy because it was colonized by the Greeks.

Hannĭbal (or Annĭbal) -ălis; the famous Carthaginian leader in the Second Punic War, who invaded Italy B.C. 218, and after various successes and misfortunes was finally defeated at Zama, near Carthage, by Scipio Africanus the Elder, B.C. 202. He died by suicide, 183, rather than fall alive into the hands of the Romans, who demanded his surrender from Prusias, king of Bithynia, with whom he had taken refuge.

Hercŭlēs, -is and -i; called Hĕrăclēs by the Greeks; the most celebrated of the heroes of antiquity; son of Zeus (Jupiter) by Alcmene, wife of Amphitryon, of Thebes in Bœotia. He was famous for his great strength and courage. "Hercle," by Hercules, was a common form of oath among the Romans.

Ĭtălia, -æ; *Italy;* at this period co-extensive with modern Italy, but formerly much more limited in extent.

Lælĭus, -i; Caius Lælius Sapiens; intimate friend and companion of the younger Africanus; born B.C. 180; successively tribune of the plebs, prætor, and consul; the supposed speaker in the "De Amicitia," which is therefore called by his name.

Lænas, -ătis; Publius Popillius; consul B.C. 132, the year after the murder of Tib. Gracchus; prosecuted with great harshness the accomplices of Tib. Gracchus; afterwards went into voluntary exile to escape the vengeance of C. Gracchus, and did not return to Rome till after his death.

Lătīni, -orum; the people of Latium, a district of Central Italy between Etruria and Campania.

Luscīnus, -i; a Roman general in the war against Pyrrhus.

Lycŏmēdēs, -is; king of the Dolopians in the island of Scyros, and grandfather of Neoptolemus, who was brought up in his palace.

Mælĭus, -i; Spurius; a wealthy plebeian knight, who bought up corn in Etruria during the great famine at Rome, B.C. 440, and sold it to the poor at a low price. The patricians accused him of aiming at kingly power, and appointed Cincinnatus dictator. Ahala, the Master of the Horse, summoned Mælius before the dictator, and on his refusal to obey, slew him.

Mancīnus, -i; Caius Hostīlĭus; consul B.C. 137; defeated by the Numantines, and purchased his safety by making peace with them, which the senate refused to recognise, and went through the ceremony of delivering him up to them; but they refused to accept him.

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Mancīnus, -i; Lucius Hostīlīus; legate of the consul L. Calpurnīus Piso, B.C. 148, in the siege of Carthage in the Third Punic War. On returning to Rome, he exhibibited in the Forum pictures representing the siege, and became in consequence so popular, that he was elected consul with Q. Fabius Maximus Æmilianus, B.C. 145.

Mānīlĭŭs, -i; Manius, a celebrated jurist; consul B.C. 149.

Maximus, -i; Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucōsus Ŏvĭcŭla Cunctātor; called Verrucosus from a mark on his upper lip: Ovicula, or the Lamb, from his mild disposition: and Cunctator, or the Delayer, from his caution in war. He was five times consul, and commanded the Roman army against Hannibal in the Second Punic War. Died, B.C. 203.

Maxīmus, -i; Quintus Fabius Maximus Æmilianus; eldest son of Lucius Paullus Æmilius, and therefore brother of the younger Scipio Africanus; having been adopted by Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, he took his name.

Metellus, -i; Quintus Cæcilius Metellus Macedonicus; augur, and colleague of Lælius and Scipio. To the latt...ch grea... a political oppo... Macedonicus ...; Lucius Tar- prætor, B.C. ...bus, *the Proud;* the usurp...d last king of Rome; donia. ...and banished B.C. 509.

Miner...ius, -i; Afer Publius; a Gre...

R...

wisdom and patroness of all the arts and trades.

Mucīus, -i; Quintus; the augur; called Scævola, *left-handed;* son-in-law of C. Lælius Sapiens; tribune of the plebs, B.C. 128; prætor of Asia, B.C. 121; consul, B.C. 117 with L. Cæcilius Metellus.

Mummīus, -i; Spuri... brother of Lucius Mumm... the conqueror of Corinth.

Nāsīca, -æ; Publius Cor... Scipio Nasica Serapio (... means, *of the pointed* ... a celebrated jurist; ... B.C. 191; defeated th... led the attack in whi... Gracchus was slain... cousin of the elder Af...

Neoptŏlĕmus, -i; ... Pyrrhus, son of ... According to the le... could not be tak... him. He was ... heroes secreted i... horse, and afte... of the city sle... king.

Nonæ, -arum; ... 5th day in a... cept Marc... October, ... on the ... the nir...

com- fleet en he , king ...wards d com-

...enian; ...thrope, ...ankind. ...s Alcibi-

...ium; an ...Mt. Ida, in corner of Asia ...site not known; ...e Greeks under ...is the subject of ...Iliad."

...ōnis; Quintus; surname ...the Stoic; tribune of ...bs B.C. 133, when he ...d his fellow tribune, Tiberius Gracchus; as prætor, B.C. 123, he opposed Caius Gracchus.

Virgĭnĭus, -i; Aulus; apparently not mentioned elsewhere.

Viscellīnus, -i; Spurius Cassius; *vid.* Cassius.

Butler & Tanner, The Selwood Printing Works, Frome, and London.

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